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A STUDY IN DOUBLE STANDARDS, DISCIPLINE, AND
TILE DISABLED STUDENT
Anne Proffitt Dupre
Abstract: School violence and other school discipline issues erode trust and confidence in
our public schools and inhibit students from obtaining the education necessary to participate
meaningfully in our nation's democratic and political institutions. This Article examines an
issue of school law that appears almost insoluble-what one judge has called the "exquisitely
difficult" issue of school discipline and the disabled student. The issue is governed by the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA, enacted in 1975), which imposes
significant constraints on school authorities who wish to discipline disruptive or violent
disabled students. School officials have stated that IDEA left them powerless to protect
teachers, staff, and other students from disabled students with severe behavior disorders. In
part to address some of these concerns, Congress amended IDEA in 1997. Indeed, school
discipline was the "top concern" and the "most contentious issue" Congress faced in the
amendment process. When the Department of Education issued Proposed Regulations in
October 1997, the passion that permeates this issue erupted once more. The Department
received over 6000 comments and was called before Congress in April 1998 to explain the
uproar. The Department promised to issue Final Regulations by May 30, 1998, but the
regulations were not promulgated until March 1999. This Article addresses this complex issue
at contextual, theoretical, and remedial levels. It first places in historical context the current
controversy over the recent amendments regarding school discipline. This examination
reveals the political spirit that infuses this issue-a spirit that resonates with the current
debate over racial affirmative action. After analyzing the effect of the new discipline
amendments, the Article explores how some theories used primarily in criminal law relate to
the school discipline issues that IDEA raises. Finally, the Article suggests how these troubling
issues can be resolved by the community, the judiciary, and Congress.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Policymakers at both local and national levels are searching for ways
to improve America's public schools. One presidential candidate has
stated that he would ensure that disruptive students are removed from the
classroom so they no longer would hinder the education of other
students.! The statement seems on its face to be a noncontroversial
proposal for a politician to make.2 This proposal, however, is steeped in
controversy. Moreover, it may be frustrated by at least one federal statute
and its new amendments that, ironically, were intended to help schools
deal with disciplinary problems.'
This Article examines the "exquisitely difficult" issue of school
discipline and the disabled student Disabled students are certainly not
the only students who cause discipline problems in school. But they are
the only students who have constraints placed on the management of
their behavior by a complex and controversial federal statute.5 The issue
is far from being resolved and, in fact, was further complicated by
amendments in 1997 to the federal statute that addresses disabled
students and education-the Individuals with Disabilities Education
I. See Bush Calls on Educators to Set Limits, Eject the Violent, San Diego Union-Trib., Nov. 3,
1999, at 4. Not long after his inauguration, Georgia Governor Roy Barnes unveiled a bill that would
allow teachers to remove unruly students from the classroom. See James Saltzer, Bill Would Allow
Teachers to Eject Rowdy Students, Athens Daily News/Athens Banner-Herald, Feb. 6, 1999, at IA.
2. See Anne P. Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order in the Public
Schools, 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 49, 51 (1996) (describing how Charlotte, North Carolina, school
system "determined that improper behavior like shouting out in class, hitting others in class, walking
around room while lesson is taught and disrupting others will no longer be tolerated").
3. See Tamara Henry, Special Ed Law Faulted; Educators: Control of Pupils an Issue, USA
Today, Apr. 14, 1997, at ID (citing poll of 1350 elementary school principals, where 78% stated that
federal law limits their freedom to discipline).
4. Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1496 (9th Cir. 1986).
5. Of course, the management of student behavior is protected by the U.S. Constitution. See
Dupre, supra note 2, at 54-59. This protection, however, is afforded to all students. As will be
explained in greater detail below, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) protects
only disabled students. Moreover, it does not allow school officials to change unilaterally the
educational placement of a disabled student, even if the child exhibits severe behavioral problems.
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Act 6-"one of the nation's most debated and emotionally charged
education laws."7
The polemic surrounding school discipline and the disabled student
has evolved over several years and embodies a tangled and often
perplexing tale. There is no one entity to blame entirely for the problems
that surround this thorny issue. Congress had a legitimate concern when
it enacted the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in
1975 to ensure that disabled children receive access to a free appropriate
public education.8 Yet despite making some needed changes to the
statute since then, Congress has been unwilling to change some of the
provisions that have proved most problematic.
This reluctance is likely due to the increased political power of
advocates for the disabled, who have taken on the civil rights mantle in
their fight for the rights of disabled persons in schools and the
workplace. 9 While many concerns over the treatment of the disabled
have been warranted, these advocates can be unyielding in their
demands, and they sometimes fail to recognize that the rights of the
disabled student cannot impede the rights of other students to obtain an
education. One commentator has observed, "The political terror of
attacking this program is more acute than any other education area I've
seen in my life. No congressman wants his office surrounded by
screaming parents and their kids in wheelchairs."'"
Educators have been frustrated by the time-consuming requirements
of IDEA and claim that they are unable to maintain safe and effective
classrooms because of the statute's restrictions." Yet it was the
6. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act is codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (Supp.
III 1997). When it was enacted in 1975, the statute was called the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act, but the name was changed in 1990. See Pub. L. 101-476, § 901(a)(1), 104 Stat. 1141
(1990). This Article refers to the Act throughout as IDEA.
7. Joetta Sack, Delay of Rules Leaves Schools in Doubt on IDEA, Educ. Wk., Mar. 10, 1999, at 1.
8. See infra note 12.
9. See Anne Proffitt Dupre, Disability and the Public Schools: The Case Against "Inclusion, " 72
Wash. L. Rev. 775, 829 (1997) (noting that movement to achieve rights for disabled has often been
compared to civil rights movement for racial equality); Rochelle L. Stanfield, Tales out of School, 27
Nat'l J. 2102, 2102 (1995) (noting that politicians have been "terrified of [organizations representing
the disabled]-that they'll trot out people in wheelchairs .... It's very easy for a member to feel
virtuous by voting for their issues.") (quoting lobbyist for education association).
10. Kay Hymowitz, Special Ed: Kids Go In, But They Don't Come Out, Manhattan Inst. City J.,
Summer 1996, at 27 (quoting Chester Finn of Hudson Institute).
11. See, e.g., infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
Vol. 75:1, 2000
Discipline and Disabled Students
recalcitrance of some schools that refused to treat disabled students with
dignity that was the impetus for the passage of IDEA in the first place.
12
Judges have, in some cases, been dismayed to learn that the statute
compelled them to prohibit schools from removing a violent disabled
student from a school or classroom. 3 In other cases, however, where it
would have been possible to defer to the judgment of educators and
enhance order in the school, courts have refused to do so. 4 The
inevitable collision between IDEA's disciplinary restrictions and the
recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that allows students who are
sexually harassed by another student to obtain monetary damages from
the school district promises to add yet another dimension to this complex
issue.' 5
Students with disabilities account for twelve percent of public school
enrollment.' 6 According to one estimate, children with crippling
disabilities account for only 1.2% of children in special education."
Nearly seventy percent of those students who have been diagnosed as
disabled suffer from emotional problems, mental retardation, or other
learning disabilities." The number of disabled students has risen
markedly in recent years "as the definition of disabled has widened to
include areas like hyperactivity and chronic fatigue syndrome."' 9 Many
of these students never exhibit behavioral problems. But those who do
can wreak havoc in the school environment, and school officials contend
that IDEA has hindered their ability to deal with these students.
12. Congress found that before the enactment of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
in 1975, the special education needs of children with disabilities were not being fully met, that more
than one-half of the children with disabilities in the United States did not receive appropriate
educational services, and that 1,000,000 of the children with disabilities in the United States were
excluded entirely from the public school system. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(A)-(C) (Supp. it 1997).
13. See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text
14. See Anne Proffitt Dupre, Disability, Deference and the Integrity of the Academic Enterprise,
32 Ga. L. Rev. 393,426-43 (1998).
15. See infra notes 318-20 and accompanying text (describing tension between IDEA and Davis
v. Monroe County Bd. ofEduc., 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999)).
16. See Editorial, Special Ed Rebels, Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1998, at A28 (citing U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights report). This figure is up from eight percent in 1976. See id.
17. See June Kronholz, Educators Say Proposed Law Boosting Ability to Punish Disabled Kids
Doesn't Go Far Enough, wall St. J., May 14, 1997, at A24.
18. See Stanfield, supra note 9, at 2103.
19. Peter Applebome, Push for School Safety Led to New Rules on Discipline, N.Y. Times, May
14, 1997, at 8.
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Part II of this Article by explains the relevant provisions of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, which Congress first passed
in 1975 and which has become the largest unfunded mandate relating to
education.2" Rather than merely discussing the new 1997 discipline
amendments, the Article allows the reader to view the new amendments
in context by presenting, in Part III, a comprehensive study of how the
statute has been interpreted by courts. Part III examines the problems
IDEA has presented relating to school discipline and explains how
Congress has dealt with those problems leading up to the 1997
amendments. Part IV then sets forth a detailed explanation and analysis
of the 1997 amendments to IDEA, which have "upset settled
expectations in important ways.' In addition, Part IV spells out how the
Department of Education has interpreted the statute in final regulations
that were promulgated amidst a furor that entailed spirited hearings
before Congress.
IDEA has been called an "extraordinary example of a good idea
having gone awry."22 The 1997 IDEA amendments were supposed to fix
some of the problems that the statute has caused regarding school
discipline. Part V of this Article explains how the new IDEA
amendments will affect discipline problems and how IDEA may
undermine the very mission of public schools. First, in Section A, the
Article details how the new amendments fail in their attempt to address
the issue of school discipline. Next, in Section B, the Article explores
some of the fundamental issues of education policy that are being
dismantled by IDEA. Finally, Part VI contends that the underlying
reason for the problems with IDEA is that when addressing issues
involving this statute, Congress has failed to use what Professor Marci
Hamilton has called the "attorneyship" model of representation. Part VI
further suggests how Congress, the courts, and the community could
begin to solve this important issue.
Before beginning this examination, the reader may wish to keep in
mind one possible effect of the school discipline issue that may not be
evident at first. As discussed in greater detail below, one issue that
20. See Hymowitz, supra note 10, at 27.
21. Dixie S. Huefner, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, 122
Educ. L. Rep. 1103, 1103 (1998).
22. See Examining the Effect of Federal Policy on the Ability of School Systems to Discipline
Students with Disabilities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Disability Policy of the Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. 71 (1995) [hereinafter Federal Disability Policy
Hearings] (statement of Marcia Reback, President, Rhode Island Federation of Teachers).
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underlies the problem of school discipline is that of school choice.' Is
the deterioration of school discipline and the decreased support for public
schools that inevitably follows merely an insidious means to increase the
clamor for school choice and public financial support for sectarian
schools? Even if increased support for school choice is not the intent
behind the IDEA discipline amendments, it may very well end up being
the result.
II. THE LEGALIZATION OF DISABILITY IN SCHOOLS
In Goss v. Lopez,24 the U.S. Supreme Court in 1975 determined by a
five-to-four vote that all students in public schools possessed procedural
due process rights that afforded them "some kind of notice" and "some
kind of hearing" before schools had the power to suspend them.' The
Court explained that for suspensions of ten days or less, students must
receive oral or written notice of the charges against them, an explanation
of the evidence the school officials possessed, and an opportunity to
present their side of the story to the school official suspending them.26
Longer suspensions may require more procedures, but schools could
immediately remove students whose presence posed a continuing danger
or an ongoing threat.27
IDEA was also enacted in 1975,28 the same year that Goss was
decided. The legislative history of IDEA indicates that a "primary
motive" for its enactment was "the fact that children with disabilities
often failed to receive any education."29 IDEA set forth both substantive
and procedural rights for disabled students, making it a mixture of a
grant and a civil rights statute.3' These substantive rights and procedural
protections are described in greater detail below.3'
23. See infra notes 470-87 and accompanying text.
24. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
25. Id. at 579.
26. See id. at 581.
27. See id. at 582-83. Notice and hearing should follow as soon as practicable. See id
28. See Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487
(Supp. i 1997)).
29. Federal Disability Policy Hearings, supra note 22, at 53 (statement of Nancy L. Jones,
Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research Service).
30. See id.
31. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1994). This brief synopsis generally sets forth the constraints placed on
school officials by the statute as enacted in 1975 and court interpretations thereof. Although the
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A. Free Appropriate Public Education
The most significant provision of IDEA is the substantive requirement
that to qualify for federal financial assistance,32 states must have a policy
that "assures all children with disabilities the right to afree appropriate
public education."33 To implement this policy, schools must develop an
"individualized educational program" (IEP)34 for each disabled child.
The IEP must contain "specially designed instruction to meet the unique
needs of children with disabilities. 35
The IEP team consists of the child's parents, at least one regular
education teacher, at least one special education teacher, a person
employed by the school who is qualified to provide or supervise the
specially designed instruction, a person who can interpret the
instructional implications of evaluation, and-at the discretion of the
school or parent-other persons who have knowledge or expertise, and,
protections described remain intact after the 1997 amendments to IDEA, the effect of some of these
provisions may be altered because of new provisions added to the statute in the 1997 amendments.
See infra notes 233-94 and accompanying text.
32. See Editorial, Schools for Disabled Children, Wash. Post, July 10, 1996, at A16 (stating that
IDEA is "second-largest source of federal aid to elementary schools").
33. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (emphasis added).
34. 20 U.S.C. § 140 1(a)(20) (1994). The IEP is defined as a written statement developed annually
for each child with a disability. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20). The requirements for the IEP are
specific and result in a detailed and lengthy document that must include:
(A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such child,
(B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional objectives,
(C) a statement of the specific instructional services to be provided to such child, and the extent
to which such child will be able to participate in regular education programs,
(D) a statement of the needed transition services for students beginning no later than age 16 and
annually thereafter (and, when determined appropriate for the individual, beginning at age 14 or
younger), including, when appropriate, a statement of the interagency reponsibilities [sic] or
linkages (or both) before the student leaves the school setting,
(E) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such services, and
(F) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at
least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved.
In the case where a participating agency, other than the educational agency, fails to provide
agreed upon services, the educational agency shall reconvene the IEP team to identify
alternative strategies to meet the transition objectives.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20) (footnote omitted).
35. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20). IDEA regulations require an annual review of the IEP to reconsider
and revise it, if appropriate. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.343 (1998) (describing logistical requirements for
IEP meetings).
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if appropriate, the child.36 The "free appropriate public education" to
which the disabled child is entitled includes (1) "special education,"37
which is defined as "specially designed instruction, at no cost to
parents ... to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability";38 and
(2) "related services," '39 which include an array of developmental,
corrective, and other support services "as may be required to assist a
child with a disability to benefit from special education."'
B. Inclusion
Although IDEA (before the 1997 amendments) did not specifically
address discipline of the disabled, it contained the so-called "stay-put"
provision that has been at the heart of the controversy surrounding the
discipline issue.4 To comprehend fully the effect of the stay-put
provision, however, it is first necessary to understand how one other
provision of IDEA, in particular, appears to contribute to many of the
problems that school officials have described.42 Under this provision of
IDEA, sometimes called "the least restrictive environment," disabled
students should be educated with nondisabled students to the maximum
extent appropriate. 4
3
IDEA requires the state to provide procedures ensuring that children
with disabilities are educated "to the maximum extent appropriate" with
36. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.344 (1998).
37. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) (1994), amendedby20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (Supp. mI 1997).
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16) (1994).
39. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994).
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17). The services that a public school would be required to provide a
disabled child include "speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and
occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, social work services, counseling
services, including rehabilitation counseling, and medical services, except that such medical services
shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17); see, e.g., Polk v.
Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 172-73 (3d Cir. 1988) (precluding
summary judgment on issue whether school must provide 14-year-old suffering from effects of
encephalopathy-who had mental and physical capacities of toddler-with services of licensed
physical therapist).
41. See Federal Disability Policy Hearings, supra note 22, at 56 (statement of Nancy L. Jones).
42. See Lynn Schnaiberg, Disciplining Special-Education Students: A Conundrum, Educ. Wk.,
Nov. 30, 1994, at 1 (noting that discipline problems are "wrapped up" in movement toward fill
inclusion of students with disabilities into regular classrooms in neighborhood schools); see also
Stanfield, supra note 9, at 2103 (quoting Assistant Director of Educational Issue Department of
American Federation of Teachers as stating that inclusion has exacerbated discipline problems).
43. 34 C.F.RL § 300.550 (1998).
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children who are not disabled." A disabled child should be removed
from the regular classroom "only when the nature or severity of the
disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily."45 The
statute fails to provide guidance on how to achieve the correct balance
between its requirement that the disabled child receive an "appropriate
public education '46 and its requirement that the disabled child be
educated "to the maximum extent appropriate" with nondisabled
children.47 Thus, the educators who comprise the disabled child's IEP
team in "cooperation" with the child's parents must use their best
professional judgment to strike this balance.48
The notion of least restrictive environment has evolved from
"mainstreaming" to full inclusion. Many inclusion advocates now
propose that all students with disabilities should be placed in regular
education classes.49 As one commentator explains:
The concept of full inclusion goes far beyond mainstreaming. In
mainstreaming, as interpreted by federal courts, the degree to which
students with disabilities are integrated into the regular classroom
varies according to the severity of a child's disability and the
difficulty of providing him or her with specialized services
necessary for an appropriate education. A student's IEP could, for
example, include special education classes for part of the day and
regular classes for the remainder of the day. Full inclusion, on the
other hand, calls for the placement of all students with disabilities
into general education classrooms, irrespective of the particular
44. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1994).
45. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B).
46. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1994).
47. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B).
48. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 209 (1982). In this case, the parents of a deaf
eight-year-old, Amy, who was placed in a regular kindergarten class, insisted that she be provided a
sign-language interpreter in all of her academic classes in the first grade. An interpreter who had
been assigned to Amy for two weeks during the kindergarten year and the school district both agreed
that Amy did not need the services of an interpreter at that time. Rather, she was provided with a
hearing aid which amplified words spoken into a wireless receiver. See id. at 184 -85.
49. See generally Dupre, supra note 9 (providing more detailed discussion of inclusion
movement).
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disability and, at times, irrespective of the student's needs or the
impact on the learning environment."0
Parents who wish for their disabled child to be included in the regular
classroom may file an action in federal court under IDEA.5 The U.S.
Supreme Court has not yet ruled on inclusion, but the lower federal
courts have offered a confusing array of opinions on the issue. 2 Despite
the fact that IDEA does not require full inclusion, many courts have
tacitly accepted the premises of the full-inclusion movement.53 Thus,
"[a]rmed with a string of court decisions, [inclusion advocates] have
made significant progress toward their goal of including all children with
disabilities in the regular classroom."
C. IDEA's Stay-Put Provision
The upshot of the full-inclusion movement is that more students with
severe behavioral problems are being placed in regular classrooms. But
once a student is placed, it can be difficult to change that placement,
even in the face of severe behavioral problems, if the parents disagree
with the school's proposal.55 Included in the procedural protections that
are part of any change in placement is the controversial "stay-put"
provision. This provision states that unless the parents agree to the
50. Omyra M. Ramsingh, Disciplining Children with Disabilities Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 12 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 155, 176 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
51. See, e.g., Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th
Cir. 1994).
52. See Dupre, supra note 9, at 794-806 (analyzing opinions from various circuits).
53. See id.; Frank J. Macchiarola et al., The Judicial System & Equality in Schools, 23 Fordham
Urb. L.., 567, 598 (1996) ("Since 1989, a series of decisions in lower federal courts have [sic]
demonstrated the judiciary's willingness to promote the cause of inclusion in the education of
students with disabilities.").
54. Inclusion Can Mean Exclusion to Deaf Students, Inclusive Educ. Programs, Dec. 1995, at 1;
see also Martha M. McCarthy, Inclusion of Children with Disabilities: Is It Required?, 95 Educ. L.
Rep. 823, 826 (1995) (noting "judicial shift toward inclusion"). As a result of recent court opinions,
some school districts in California feel the proper course of action is full inclusion: "[P]lace all
handicapped children in regular education classes, regardless of their mental, physical or emotional
disabilities." Theresa Bryant, Drowning in the Mainstream: Integration of Children with Disabilities
After Oberti v. Clementon School District, 22 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 83, 116 (1995) (citing Sarah Lubman,
More Schools Embrace "FullInclusion "ofthe Disabled, Wall St J., Apr. 13, 1994, at Bi).
55. See Editorial, Schools for Disabled Children, Wash. Post, July 10, 1996, at A16 (stating that
"as a legal matter" IDEA has meant that "a parent could insist on keeping a child in [a mainstream
classroom] no matter what the wider effects on the class").
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proposed change, the student is allowed to remain in the current
placement pending a final court decision regarding the change.56
Put simply, the stay-put provision constrains the actions of educators
whenever there is a dispute about any "change in placement." A change
in placement can occur with certain disciplinary actions-for example,
an expulsion or suspension for more than ten days.57 But a change in
placement also can occur even if the school wishes to continue
educational services in a more restrictive environment-if, for instance, a
school wishes to move a student with a severe behavioral problem from a
regular classroom to a special education classroom.5
Any proposed change in placement (including any change for
disciplinary reasons) triggers significant procedural requirements,
including detailed notice to parents and a meeting of the IEP team
(including parents) to determine if the bad conduct is related to the
disability and if the current placement is appropriate.59 Parents must be
informed of their right to an impartial hearing and then to judicial review
if they disagree with a new placement decision.6 Parents can challenge a
placement decision at several levels-administrative hearings, court
proceedings in district or state courts, and appeals. The statute's fee-
shifting provision allows "reasonable attorneys' fees" to a parent or
guardian (but not to the school) who is a "prevailing party."' 6'
Thus, if a student exhibits severe behavioral problems (like toilet
accidents, temper tantrums, crawling and hiding under furniture, or
hitting and spitting on other children),6a and a parent disagrees with the
school that the student will be better off in a more restrictive school
56. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3)(A) (1994). The provision provides in part: "[D]uring the pendency
of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local educational agency
and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then current educational
placement of such child." As explained below, schools may go to court to seek an injunction dissolving the
stay-put provision if they have sufficient evidence that the disabled student is "truly dangerous." Honig v.
Doe, 484 U.S. 305,326 (1988); see infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
57. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.519 (1999). The 1999 regulations attempt to clarify when a change in
placement occurs. See infra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1207 (3d Cir. 1993).
59. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1994).
60. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2).
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B) (1994). Courts have recently been showing more willingness to
allow money damage claims for violations of IDEA, including at least one court that stated that
punitive damages were available against individual school officials for violations of IDEA. See
Mason v. Schenectady City Sch. Dist., 879 F. Supp. 215, 220 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
62. See Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1208 (describing behavior of severely disabled student).
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setting (a self-contained special education classroom, for instance), the
parents may challenge the decision in time- and resource-consuming
administrative and court proceedings. According to the pre-amendment
statute, during the time that these proceedings occur, the disabled student
could not be moved from the regular classroom unless the parent agreed,
with the following narrow exception: if school officials believed that the
student was truly dangerous and had sufficient evidence that the disabled
student was likely to injure others, the school could go to court to obtain
permission to remove the student.63 As explained below, changes in the
new amendments allow school authorities to request a hearing officer to
order the removal of a violent student who is considered sufficiently
dangerous. This exception does not allow schools to remove a disabled
student who is severely disruptive but not considered by a court to be
sufficiently violent.
The timeline involved in a typical scenario may unfold as follows:
After a child is placed in a regular classroom and then poses a severe
discipline problem, the school will work to increase supports and
interventions, sometimes for months.' If these interventions do not
resolve the problem, the school will reconvene the IEP committee, which
may recommend that the student be moved to a more restrictive
educational environment--sometimes for part of a school day, some-
times for the entire school day. Then, if the parent still opposes a change
in placement, months will likely be spent on legal preparation and expert
testimony, as well as the time involved before a hearing officer, district
court, and appeals court.65 Unless the school can convince a court to
grant an injunction-which some courts have been reluctant to do despite
evidence of violent behavior--the student will stay put in the regular
classroom during that time.
63. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305,326 (1988); infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Hartmann v. Loudoun County Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 996, 999-1000 (1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1046 (1998) (describing interventions attempted throughout entire school year
before IEP team proposed to remove autistic student from regular classroom and place him in class
specifically structured for autistic children).
65. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 322 (noting that judicial and administrative review process is
"ponderous" and pointing out that this case it was addressing took seven years to reach Court);
Hartmann, 118 F.3d 996 (demonstrating length of review process: request for placement made in
May 1994; Court of Appeals decision rendered in July 1997); see also Theresa J. Bryant, The Death
Knell for School Expulsion: The 1997 Amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 487, 498 (1998) (pointing out that invoking stay-put provision may delay
expulsion for months or years).
66. See infra notes 145-60 and accompanying text.
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Some schools are well aware of the tragic consequences of improperly
placing a violent disabled student. For example, one disabled student
with a history of problems was sent from a special education center to a
regular high school.67 Within two days after he arrived at his new school,
he severely beat, raped, and murdered a fifteen-year-old girl in the girls'
restroom.
68
As with any controversial issue, the complicated problems
surrounding discipline and the disabled student under IDEA developed
over time. The 1997 IDEA amendments were not enacted in a vacuum.
To understand the context that surrounded the enactment of the 1997
amendments, it is helpful to examine how schools and courts have
addressed some of the discipline issues that have arisen under IDEA
since its enactment in 1975.
III. THE PRE-AMENDMENT BACKDROP: DISCIPLINE ISSUES
UNDER IDEA
IDEA did not expressly address the authority of school officials to
discipline disabled students.6 9 This lacuna caused confusion and
uncertainty for educators who were uncertain as to their rights and
responsibilities. The issue of school discipline and the disabled student
has thus become a matter of "great controversy and confusion"7 as
courts have "struggl[ed] under the weight of litigation involving
[disabled] students."'" Courts have been pushed into the fray in the
attempt to balance the disabled student's right to a free appropriate
public education with the public school's duty to maintain order so that
all students can obtain an education.72
Although the many procedural protections in the statute were chiefly
designed to guard against the reclassification of disabled students for
educational reasons, these protections were also regarded as creating
67. See Bill McClellan, Trial Opening Shows That Enlightenment May Have Dark Side, St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Feb. 13, 1998, at Dl.
68. See id.
69. See Mark G. Yudof et al., Educational Policy and the Law 734 (1992).
70. Mitchell L. Yell, Honig v. Doe: The Suspension and Expulsion of Handicapped Students, 56
Exceptional Children 60, 69 (1989).
71. Larry Bartlett, Disciplining Handicapped Students: Legal Issues in Light of Honig v. Doe, 55
Exceptional Children 357, 364 (1989).
72. See Yell, supra note 70, at 60.
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procedural rights when the disabled student was disciplined.73 As
explained above, the so-called stay-put provision most directly affected
discipline, as it prohibited schools from removing disabled students from
the educational placement set forth in the IEP without parental consent.74
In essence, the provision on its face seemed to give parents the right to
keep the student in the educational setting even though the student would
otherwise be subject to school disciplinary measures.7"
A. Discipline Issues After the Enactment of IDEA
1. Suspension and Expulsion
One of the traditional school disciplinary actions is "expulsion,"
defined here as a long-term removal from school. A school "suspension"
may consist of removal from school for an indefinite time (until the case
can be considered by the school board, for example) or a temporary
suspension, which is constitutionally permissible under Goss v. Lopez, as
long as some kind of notice and hearing is provided.76 IDEA has had a
major impact on the suspension and/or expulsion of disabled students.
Even if a school provides educational services to the disabled student
while he or she is suspended, those who oppose expelling or suspending
disabled students maintain that the disabled child's social development is
hindered, as homebound tutoring provided by the school does not allow
the student to interact with other students.77 Moreover, some commen-
73. See Yudof et al., supra note 69, at 734 (citing Comment, The Legal Limits of School
Discipline for Children with Handicaps, 69 Or. L. Rev. 117 (1990)).
74. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3)(A) (1994).
75. When a student was suspended for 35 days for misconduct that included physical attacks on a
teacher and other students, the parents had him evaluated by a private psychologist who maintained
that the boy had a learning disability. The parents wanted the boy returned to school pending
evaluation by the school. When the school refused, the parents brought suit. See Doe v. Rockingham
County Sch. Bd., 658 F. Supp. 403, 409 (W.D. Va. 1987). The school argued that the boy should
"stay put" in his current placement-suspension-until the dispute was resolved, but the court found
that "leaving a handicapped child under disciplinary suspension during the pendency of
administrative proceedings violated both the language and the intent of the 'stay put"' rule. Id.
76. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text; see also John R. Paddock Jr., Comment, The
Rights of Handicapped Students in Disciplinary Proceedings by Public School Authorities, 53 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 367,377,385-86 (1981).
77. See Lamont X. v. Quisenberry, 606 F. Supp. 809, 814 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (finding that home-
bound program is "change in placement," giving rise to IDEA procedural protections); Stuart v.
Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 (D. Conn. 1979).
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tators claim that suspension or expulsion stigmatizes students, thwarts
intellectual development, and may cause psychological damage.78
School officials, on the other hand, contend that a double standard for
student behavior disserves disabled children, as it leads them to believe
that their inappropriate behavior is excused because of their disability,
and they obtain a false impression of society's expectations.79 In the
wake of the enactment of IDEA, school officials argued that a comment
to the regulations promulgated under the statute at least permitted the
expulsion or suspension of dangerous students.8" The comment allowed
schools to use their "normal procedures"--which would include
suspensions and expulsions-to deal with "children who are endangering
themselves or others.""1 Schools also defended other disciplinary actions
in court, including in-school suspensions in a three-by-five-foot
"timeout" room,8" paddling, isolated seating in the classroom and
cafeteria, refusing to allow the student to participate in a class field trip,
and having a student put tape on his mouth to remind himself to be
quiet."
78. See Sanford F. Remz, Note, Legal Remedies for the Misclassification or Wrongful Placement
of Educationally Handicapped Children, 14 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 389, 425-26 (1979).
79. See Caryn Gelbman, Suspensions and Expulsions Under the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act: Victory for Handicapped Children or Defeat for School Officials?, 36 Wash. U. J.
Urb. & Contemp. L. 137, 156 (1989).
80. See, e.g., Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1336 (W.D.N.Y. 1979)
(arguing that comment allowed schools to discipline students that are dangerous); Stuart, 443 F.
Supp. at 1242 (same).
81. 34 C.F.R. § 300.513 cmt. (1998). The comment stated:
Section 300.513 [the regulation regarding the disabled student's status during administrative or
judicial proceedings] does not permit a child's placement to be changed during a complaint
proceeding, unless the parents and agency agree otherwise. While the placement may not be
changed, this does not preclude the agency from using its normal procedures for dealing with
children who are endangering themselves or others.
34 C.F.R. § 300.513 cmt. (1998).
82. Hayes v. Unified Sch. Dist. Number 377, 669 F. Supp. 1519, 1524 (D. Kan. 1987), rev'd, 877
F.2d 809, 813 (10th Cir. 1989) (concluding that in-school suspension for up to five days is not
change in placement).
83. See Cole v. Greenfield-Cent. Community Schs., 657 F. Supp. 56, 62 (S.D. Ind. 1986). The
court stated that the teacher had a duty to provide an adequate educational experience to all students
in the classroom, not only the mainstreamed disabled student. See id. The desirability of
mainstreaming allowed such actions. See id. The taping incidents were not extreme under the
circumstances. See id.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that paddling does not violate the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment or the Fourteenth Amendment requirements for
procedural due process. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 (1977).
Discipline and Disabled Students
Courts struggled to balance the statutory mandate that a disabled
student must be afforded a free appropriate public education with the
school's interest in maintaining a safe and productive learning environ-
ment. Courts generally agreed that an expulsion constituted a change in
placement under the statute, which triggered IDEA's parental procedural
protections. 8 Thus, under IDEA's stay-put provision, students must
remain in their current placement-they could not be expelled or even
moved to a more restrictive classroom setting-until all parent
complaints had been resolved through the administrative hearings and
then the courts. 5 Because state laws differed regarding how many days
constituted expulsion, inconsistent rules developed regarding how many
days constituted a change in placement for IDEA purposes.86
Some courts implied a dangerousness exception into the stay-put
provision of the statute. For example, in a case involving a disabled
student who brought a razor blade to school and threatened to injure or
kill another student, the Eleventh Circuit allowed the school to move the
disabled student to an alternative school while review proceedings (the
due process hearings and subsequent appeals allowed by the statute)
went forward.
87
2. Misconduct Related to Disability
Although the statute does not require the school to determine whether
the student's misconduct was related to the disability, courts agreed that
a disabled student should not be expelled for conduct that was related to
the disability.8 Schools sought to limit the "relationship" test (that is,
whether the student's behavior is related to the disability) to cases where
the student was classified as "seriously emotionally disturbed."89 In other
words, school officials argued that disabled students who were not
84. See Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1482 (9th Cir. 1986); Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595, 601
(6th Cir. 1982); Stuart, 443 F. Supp. at 1242-43.
85. See Stuart, 443 F. Supp. at 1242-43.
86. Compare Maher, 793 F.2d at 1484 (concluding that 30-day suspension does not constitute
change in placement), with Stuart, 443 F. Supp. at 1242 (concluding that 10-day suspension
constitutes change in placement).
87. See Victoria L. v. District Sch. Bd., 741 F.2d 369, 371 (11th Cir. 1984); see also Stuart, 443
F. Supp. at 1242 (holding that school authorities can deal with emergencies by suspending disabled
students, but implying that this is limited to 10-day, short-term suspension).
88. See Bartlett, supra note 71, at 360; see also, e.g., Maher, 793 F.2d at 1483-84.
89. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1981).
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seriously emotionally disturbed should be able to demonstrate proper
behavior.9" Courts have not generally been receptive to this argument,
noting that the statute's procedural protections apply to all disabled
students.9'
Determining whether bad conduct was related to a disability proved to
be a thorny issue. It was nonetheless a necessary determination, as some
jurisdictions concluded that a disabled student could be expelled if the
behavior was not a manifestation of the student's disability.92 The IEP
team makes the initial decision whether the conduct is related to the
disability, but parents may appeal the decision to a hearing officer and to
the courts.93 Some courts of appeal reasoned that related behavior meant
any behavior that is attributable to the disability or that is in some way a
result or manifestation of the disability.94 Thus, one court decided that a
student with a learning disability who was a go-between in a drug deal
was exhibiting behavior that was related to his disability, because his
disability caused him to have low self-esteem which, in turn, caused him
to be susceptible to peer pressure.95 Other courts have stated that conduct
that bears only an attenuated relationship to the disability-like
misbehavior to get attention due to low self-esteem-is not sufficiently
related to the disability.96 Moreover, before the 1997 amendments
changed the landscape, some courts held that educational services could
be terminated for students who were expelled due to conduct that was not
related to their disability.97
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Maher, 793 F.2d at 1482; Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 229 (N.D. Ind. 1979). But cf
Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595, 602 (6th Cir. 1982) (concluding that expulsion cannot end
educational services); Turlington, 635 F.2d at 350 (same).
93. See School Bd. v. Malone, 762 F.2d 1210, 1217-18 (4th Cir. 1985).
94. See id. at 1216-17.
95. See id. In School Board v. Malone, 662 F. Supp. 978, 980 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d
1210 (4th Cir. 1985), the court disagreed with an IEP committee that found no causal connection
between the student's disability and his drug dealing. The court decided that the student's disability
caused low self-esteem, which caused him to be susceptible to peer pressure, and that the learning
disability prevented the student from understanding the long-term consequences of his actions. In
Maher, 793 F.2d at 1480, the court noted that the misconduct of an emotionally handicapped student
will not always be related to the disabling condition. See also Turlington, 635 F.2d at 346 (rejecting
school's argument that conduct of disabled students who could tell right from wrong was not related
to disability).
96. See Maher, 793 F.2d at 1482.
97. See Doe v. Board of Educ., 115 F.3d 1273, 1277 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating originally that school
district is not required to provide continued educational services to expelled students, but amending
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B. The Supreme Court and Discipline
The enactment of IDEA significantly changed the traditional notion
that schools enjoyed great discretion in dealing with serious student
misbehavior. "For the first time, the nation's courts, including the U.S.
Supreme Court [began] telling school officials that their discretion in
dealing with serious student misconduct may be greatly limited."98 In
1988-thirteen years after IDEA was enacted-the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the issue of expelling disabled students and determined that
school officials could not unilaterally expel even a dangerous disabled
student from school.99 In Honig v. Doe,00 the Court addressed whether
the San Francisco Unified School District could expel two emotionally
disturbed children indefinitely for disruptive and violent behavior."0 ' One
of the students, a seventeen-year-old, assaulted another student-
choking the other student with sufficient force to leave abrasions on the
child's neck-and kicked out a school window while being escorted to
the principal's office afterwards. 2 The school commenced expulsion
proceedings (which included a hearing) and suspended the student until
the proceedings could be completed.'0 3
The other student"°4 had been identified as an emotionally disturbed
child, whose IEP stated that he was "easily distracted, impulsive, and
opinion after new IDEA amendments, limiting opinion to cases before amendments); Virginia Dep't
of Educ. v. Riley, 23 F.3d 80, 82 (4th Cir. 1994). But see Turlington, 635 F.2d at 348 (stating that
expulsion could not result in complete termination of educational services, but failing to illuminate
what services could be eliminated); Magyar v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 25 IDELR 608, 609 (D.
Ariz. 1997) (finding that school was required to provide educational services to student with
emotional disability who was suspended for bringing knife to school); Metropolitan Sch. Dist. v.
Davila, 770 F. Supp. 1331, 1339 (S.D. Ind. 1991), rev'd, 969 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1991) (concluding
that all students with disabilities, even if expelled because of conduct unrelated to their disabilities,
must continue to receive educational services).
98. Bartlett, supra note 71, at 357.
99. See Dori Meinert, Schools'Power to Expel Limited: High Court Ruling Protects Emotionally
Troubled Pupils, San Diego Union-Trib., Jan. 21, 1988, at Al (stating that the Honig opinion
"sharply limited public school officials' power to suspend or expel emotionally disturbed pupils for
disruptive or dangerous behavior").




104. The school had placed the student in a learning center for emotionally disturbed children. His
grandparents wished him to be in the regular public school setting, and the school acquiesced. The
student began to misbehave almost immediately after being placed in a regular classroom setting,
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anxious. '15 His evaluative records showed that he was "unable 'to
control verbal or physical outburst[s]' and exhibited a '[s]evere
disturbance in relationships with peers and adults."" 6 The student's
chronically disruptive behavior-including stealing, extorting money
from fellow students, and making sexual comments to female
classmates-led to a five-day suspension and a recommendation by the
Student Placement Committee to suspend the student indefinitely
pending a final disposition in the matter.' 7 Attorneys for both students
protested that these actions violated IDEA.' 5
At the time, a suspension in excess of ten days or an expulsion was
considered a "change in the placement" of the disabled child.'09 Thus,
according to the statute, the parents had the right to notice, an
opportunity to present complaints concerning the school's decision, and
an opportunity for a due process hearing respecting any complaints. ' 0 If
the parents were unsatisfied after the hearing, they could obtain further
administrative review."' If still unsatisfied, the parents could file a civil
action in a state or federal court and could appeal the result of that
action.11
Because these numerous hearings and court proceedings often take a
long time to run their course," 3 the school must determine how to deal
with the child during this time. As explained above, IDEA states that
pending the completion of any review proceedings, the disabled child
and school officials met with his grandparents twice to convince them to allow the school to place
the child in a half-day program. See id. at 314-15.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 314 (quoting school evaluative records).
107. See id. at315.
108. IDEA was called the Education of the Handicapped Act at this time. See supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
109. Honig, 484 U.S. at 325 n.8. The Court observed that the statute did not define "change in
placement" and that neither the structure of the statute nor its legislative history provided any
guidance regarding how that phrase applied to fixed suspensions. See id. at 323. The Department of
Education's Office of Civil Rights had taken the position that a suspension of up to 10 days did not
amount to a change in placement. See id. The Court deferred to this construction, noting that it
comported with the purposes of the statute: "Congress sought to prevent schools from permanently
and unilaterally excluding disabled children by means of indefinite suspensions and expulsions; the
power to impose fixed suspensions of short duration does not carry the potential for total exclusion
that Congress found so objectionable." Id.
110. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)-(2) (1994); see also Honig, 484 U.S. at 311-12.
111. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1994).
112. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1994).
113. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 323.
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"shall remain in [his or her] then current educational placement" unless
the parents agree to the change." 4 The educators claimed and, some
courts had agreed," 5 that the residual authority of school officials to
exclude dangerous students meant that the school could keep violent or
dangerous students from the classroom until the review process was
complete.
The Supreme Court stated that the statute had no exception for
dangerous students and that such students could be removed only with
permission of the parents or with the approval of a court."6 "We think it
clear, however, that Congress very much meant to strip schools of the
unilateral authority they had traditionally employed to exclude disabled
students, particularly emotionally disturbed students, from school."'1
7
Congress thereby denied school officials "their former right to 'self-
help,' and directed that in the future the removal of disabled students
could be accomplished only with the permission of the parents or, as a
last resort, the courts.""'
The Supreme Court maintained that educators were not "hamstrung,"
but could make use of study carrels, timeouts, detention, or the restriction
of privileges.' If a student poses an "immediate threat to the safety of
others, officials may temporarily suspend him or her for up to 10
schooldays."'2 ° If the parent of a "truly dangerous child" persists in
refusing to permit any change in placement, educators can turn to the
courts. Although the statute requires that the school must exhaust time-
consuming administrative proceedings,' the Court stated that the school
might be able to bypass this administrative review in some cases if the
school could meet its burden of showing that administrative review
would be futile or inadequate." If the school could meet this burden, it
then had the additional burden of demonstrating that keeping the student
in the classroom was "substantially likely to result in injury either to
114. 20 U.S.C. §1415(e)(3)(A) (1994).
115. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
116. See Honig,484 U.S. at 323-24.
117. Id. at 323.
118. Id. at 323-24.
119. See id. at 325.
120. Id. In its discussion of these alternative disciplinary measures, the Court did not exempt
students whose conduct was related to their disability, implying that "relationship" in this context
made no difference.
121. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1994), cited in Honig, 484 U.S. at 326.
122. See Honig,484 U.S. at 326-27.
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himself or herself, or to others."' If the school could demonstrate this
level of potential violence, the court might enjoin the student from
attending school.
The upshot of the opinion was that there was no dangerousness or
emergency exception to IDEA's stay-put provision. A school could not
unilaterally decide to expel for more than ten days a dangerous or
disruptive student who posed a threat to the safety of others. If the
parents steadfastly refused to agree to a change in placement in the IEP
for a dangerous student, the school must seek an injunction in court,
where the school bore a heavy burden to overcome the presumption that
the student remain in his or her current placement.
The opinion was inconsistent in the way it treated congressional
silence.'24 After all, the Court stated that because Congress was silent as
to the dangerous disabled student, there was no dangerousness exception
in the statute. Yet the Court determined that schools possessed another
remedy that also was nowhere to be seen in the statute-the opportunity
to circumvent the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The Court was criticized for "essentially grant[ing] schools [an] implied
dangerousness exception" by allowing courts to remove disabled
students from school through an injunction.'25 In addition, the Court was
criticized for allowing schools easier access to the courts (through a
circumvention of the administrative proceedings), because "[t]he
judiciary's expertise on the essentials of a handicapped child's
educational program is minimal, if existent at all."'26 Further, commen-
tators pointed out the Court created a new liability issue for schools:
school officials may be forced to keep a disabled child in a classroom
pending a hearing because a parent refuses to give consent for
suspension, but schools are still responsible for the welfare of all the
students in attendance and may be liable if the disabled child harms
another child.'27
123. Id. at 328.
124. See Christopher L. Baxter, Comment, Right to a Free and Appropriate Education: The
Education for All the Handicapped Act Does Not Contain an Implicit "Dangerousness Exception,"
20 Rutgers L.J. 561, 573-74 (1989).
125. Id. at 575.
126. Id. at 576 (reasoning that professionals on the student's IEP committee are more experienced
in dealing with disabled children in education than is the judiciary, which is the "most inexperienced
panel available"); see also Dupre, supra note 14, at 450.
127. See Baxter, supra note 124, at 577-78.
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C. In the Aftermath of the Honig Decision
The reaction of educators to the Honig decision was measured at first.
The press deemed the decision a defeat for educators, who had argued
"that they should be able to act quickly and unilaterally when they
believe that a [disabled] student poses a danger to others."' 28 The
California school superintendent, Bill Honig, in whose name the case
was brought, stated that he "could live with the decision.' '12 Super-
intendent Honig considered the Supreme Court opinion "another
example of how courts get involved with the day-to-day operations of
schools to the detriment of schools,"'3 ° but he reasoned, "At least it gives
us some clarity about what districts can and can't do."'' He claimed-
wrongly as it turned out-that because of the Honig opinion, "if there is
even a hint of a discipline problem, the kid will be put in a special
education class from the start and will not be allowed to attend regular
classes.' 32 In reality, schools have been hamstrung in their efforts to
place disabled disruptive students in special education classes. The
advocates of the full-inclusion movement and the courts that have tacitly
accepted the premises of this movement have "made significant progress
toward their goal of including all students with disabilities in the regular
classroom," including disabled students with severe behavioral
problems.3
3
Honig's effect on school discipline became clearer as it was applied
by lower courts. Professor Michael Heise has observed, "It's pretty clear
that, by gaming the legal rules, parents can effectively hamstring school
officials under IDEA.' ' 34 Educators began to claim that IDEA's stay-put
provision as interpreted by Honig "can make it impossible to protect
teachers and other students if a disabled student turns dangerous.' 35
128. David G. Savage, Expelling Violent Handicapped Students Curbed, L.A. Times, Jan. 21,
1988, at 1.
129. Id
130. Meinert, supra note 99, at Al.
131. Savage, supra note 128, at 1.
132. William Carlsen, Schools Lose Ruling on Disturbed Students, S.F. Chron., Jan. 21, 1988, atAl.
133. Inclusion Can Mean Exclusion to DeafStudents, supra note 54, at 1.
134. Stuart Anderson, Why Schools Don't Dare to Discipline the Disabled, Wkly. Standard, Feb.
19, 1996, at 29, 31 (stating that this premise has led to double standard that "defies common sense
and leaves children, particularly other special education students, to face dangerous peers who are
above the law").
135. Don J. DeBenedictis, Schools See Disabled Protection as Threat to Safety, Nat'l L.J., June
27, 1994, at A9.
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Others have lauded the statute and the Honig decision, stating that
"[limiting school officials' disciplinary authority will result in less
discrimination against the handicapped."'36 Advocates for the disabled
claim that "[t]he stay-put provision is necessary because all too often
schools make judgments solely on the basis of a child's superficial
behavior, rather than by trying to figure out what's causing the
behavior."'37 Disability advocates maintain that expelling a disabled
student is an "insidious attempt to undercut the very purpose of
[IDEA].' 38
Many questions remained open after Honig. Despite the Court's
assurances that educators were not "hamstrung"--that they still could
employ normal disciplinary procedures 39-it remained unclear what
normal disciplinary procedures may entail and when parents could
challenge them successfully as a change in placement. 40 After all, long-
term suspension or expulsion for violent students had been normal
disciplinary procedure in San Francisco before the Court's decision in
Honig. The Honig opinion did not include in its list of disciplinary
options the possibility of a change to a more restrictive environment-a
special education classroom or an alternative school setting 4-and the
Office of Civil Rights stated that suspensions that total more than ten
days in one school year constitute a change in placement (meaning that
IDEA procedural safeguards are thereby triggered). 41 One court stated,
"The touchstone.., has to be whether the decision is likely to affect in
136. Gelbman, supra note 79, at 165.
137. DeBenedictis, supra note 135, at A9 (quoting Steven Novick, Executive Director of the
Oklahoma Disability Law Center).
138. Savage, supra note 128, at 1 (quoting Sheila Brogna, attorney for Legal Services for
Children of San Francisco, who argued Honig). Toby Rubin, another attorney in the case, stated,
"This will prevent the schools from simply saying, 'You're out, go home,' when there is a problem with
handicapped children, instead of addressing the problem directly." Carlsen, supra note 132, at Al.
139. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 325 (1988).
140. See generally Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1484 (9th Cir. 1986) (determining that changes
in program that do not amount to change in placement are appropriate disciplinary measures); Gail
P. Sorenson, Special Education Discipline in the 1990s, 62 Educ. L. Rep. 387, 396 (1990) ("Despite
the Supreme Court's explicit approval in Honig of 'normal' in-school disciplinary measures
including time-outs, study carrels, and the restriction of privileges, it is not difficult to imagine
circumstances that would violate [IDEA's] provisions.").
141. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 325 (study carrels, timeouts, detention, restriction of privileges and
temporary suspension up to ten days).
142. See Bartlett, supra note 71, at 362-63 (citing 1985 Department of Education letter from
Thomas to Nail). See also infra notes 236-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1999
regulations on this issue.
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some significant way the child's learning experience."' 43 Even this
interpretation was not particularly helpful, however, as what is
significant for one disabled child may not be significant for another.
Notably, the Honig opinion did not mention corporal punishment,
although the Supreme Court has held that corporal punishment is not
unconstitutional."
Although the Honig Court stated that schools could ask courts to
suspend a disabled student who was "truly dangerous," the Court did not
explain what the school had to prove to show that a student was "truly
dangerous."'45 Educators described cases where they were forced to seek
court approval before removing severely disruptive, disabled students
from class, "even though one student allegedly injured a classmate and
two staff members, and another allegedly threatened to injure or kill
several people at his school."'" One case sounded eerily like the
harbinger of school killings that have erupted across the nation in recent
years. A ninth-grade disabled boy stated that Charles Manson was his
hero "because he had people killed." The student advocated smashing an
administrator's head, vandalizing her car, and assaulting a school
official's wife.'47 The parents refused the school's proposal to transfer
the student to a special program that educators stated would better suit
his needs.'48 The school was powerless to act until it obtained court
approval to remove the child. The school in this case was able to
convince the court that the student should be barred temporarily from the
school campus.'49 But another court turned down the plea of a school that
attempted to move a disruptive disabled student from a regular classroom
to a special education setting in lieu of suspension or expulsion. The
143. DeLeon v. Susquehanna Community Sch. Dist., 747 F.2d 149, 153 (3d Cir. 1984).
144. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,671, 682 (1977).
145. Yell, supra note 70, at 67; see also Edward J. Sarzynski, Disciplining a Handicapped
Student, 46 Educ. L. Rep. 17, 24 (1988) (arguing that in stating that dangerous disabled students are
not immune from discipline, Court "may actually have immunized a greater number of [disabled]
students from the disciplinary process").
146. Jay Mathews, California Uses Courts to Oust Students; Principals Powerless to Expel the
Unruly.from Special-Ed Classes, Wash. Post, June 3, 1989, at A5. The article describes two cases in
California. In the first, school administrators at a school for the blind wished to suspend a 21-year-
old blind and deaf woman (IDEA applies to disabled students from ages 3 to 21) who had struck two
staff members and a classmate. The school had documented 30 separate declarations from people





court reportedly determined that conduct like hitting students, kicking
staff members, upturning a desk, and putting the teacher on stress-related
leave did not show that the student was dangerous enough under the
statute to be removed.'
The Eighth Circuit set forth two requirements a school must meet
before it could change the placement of a disabled student. 5 ' The student
in the case had hit, kicked, slapped, and bitten other students, as well as
thrown pencils and other objects in classmates' eyes-committing
eleven to nineteen aggressive acts a week, thirty of which required the
attention of the school nurse.'52 The parents had argued that the standard
for removal should require the school to show, in addition to the above,
that the student was "truly dangerous" and that the student actually
intended to cause harm. 53 Instead, the court stated that the school must
prove that (1) it is "substantially likely" that maintaining the disabled
student in the current placement would result in injury to the student or
other, and (2) the school district had done all that it reasonably could to
reduce the risk that the disabled student would cause injury.'54 To
demonstrate that it had done all it could to reduce the risk of further
misconduct, a school must show that it has attempted numerous
interventions, some of which may be costly.'55 For example, one school
reported the techniques it attempted to improve the behavior of a twelve-
year-old disabled boy who repeatedly attacked his teacher, aide, and
therapist, both sexually and physically. 56 Those methods included
"explaining proper behavior to the boy; providing a two-to-one pupil-
teacher ratio for field trips; providing a teacher to work individually with
150. See DeBenedictis, supra note 135, at A9 (describing case); see also Student with Razor
Should Stay Put District Court Rules, Special Educator, Mar. 28, 1997, at 1, 8 (reporting that court
dissolved temporary restraining order to bar disabled student's attendance at school and transfer her
to alternative placement after student cut classmate with razor).
151. See Light v. Parkway C-2 Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 1223, 1228 (8th Cir. 1994).
152. See id. at 1225, 1229.
153. Id. at 1228.
154. Id.
155. In School District v. Stephan M., 25 IDELR 506, 508 (E.D. Pa. 1997), the court questioned
why the school had not instituted measures to search a student who had cut another with razor blade
to avoid future problems. The court pointed out that the school had not detailed a security employee,
obtained an electronic detecting device, or had a female administrator or professional employee
conduct searches, and that the school had not offered an explanation why it had not done so. See id.
156. See Anne Lindberg, District Sues to Move Autistic Boy, St. Petersburg Times, Mar. 13, 1997,
at 8 (describing teacher who threatened to quit unless school system removed disabled student who
grabbed her legs, buttocks, and genitals, hit her, kicked her, and choked her).
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him during group speech therapy; isolating him from other pupils when
necessary; and assigning him a personal assistant."' 7
Courts have continued to set a high bar before granting relief from
IDEA's stay-put provisions, ruling that significant acts of violence were
insufficient to allow a school to expel a student or remove him to another
setting. 5 Indeed, one commentator could find only one case where an
appellate court held that a school could remove a disabled student
because the Honig standard'59 for dangerousness had been met."6
As school violence increased, school officials were "caught between
the converging currents of a 'zero tolerance' policy for guns and other
contraband and a 'zero reject' policy for students with disabilities."''
One judge noted, "[T]he statute may be misused so that school children
can be exposed to the dangers inherent in the bringing of a firearm to
school while the student responsible for bringing the gun escapes the
consequences of the action."'6 Forced to tell a school that it could
neither expel a disabled student who brought a handgun to school nor
move the student to another school until he was evaluated,'63 Judge
Judith N. Keep deplored the situation as one "that can cause parents, if
157. Id
158. See Aaron D. Rachelson, Expelling Students Who Claim to Be Disabled: Escaping the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act's "Stay-Put" Provision, 2 Mich. L. & Pol'y Rev. 127,
149-50 (1997).
159. Maintaining the student in the current placement was substantially likely to result in injury to
the student or others. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 328 (1988).
160. See Rachelson, supra note 158, at 149-50 (citing Light v. Parkway C-2 Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d
1223 (8th Cir. 1994)). The court reviewed evidence that for two years a 13-year-old disabled student
committed 11 to 19 aggressive acts per week that included biting, hitting and kicking her teachers,
poking others in the eye, throwing objects, and turning over furniture. See Light v. Parkway C-2 Sch.
Dist., 41 F.3d 1223, 1225 (8th Cir. 1994). The attention of the school nurse was required for some 30
incidents. See id.
161. Perry A. Zirkel, Disabling Discipline?, Phi Delta Kappan, Mar. 1995, at 568, 569. The
school district's counsel for the appeal stated that the case had "serious and significant implications
for schools with regard to crimes on campus." Id He pointed out that the decision "effectively
creates an immunity for disability not only from school discipline but also from the state criminal
process.' Id (quoting Charles Weatherly, who was discussing the district court decision, later
affirmed on appeal); see also Mary George, Armed Kids in Special Ed, Aided by Law, Expulsion
Prohibited IfDisability at Fault, Denver Post, Dec. 12, 1996, at A-I (describing case in Boulder,
Colorado, where four students passed around gun at school but only one was expelled because others
were protected by IDEA).
162. M.P. v. Governing Bd. of Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F. Supp. 1044, 1048 (S.D.
Cal. 1994).
163. See infra notes 243-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of how Congress attempted
to amend IDEA to deal with the problem of guns in schools.
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they have any money whatsoever, to remove their children from a public
school., , "M
Congress passed the Gun-Free Schools Act in 1994,165 which
mandated that all school districts must have a policy that students who
bring a firearm to school will be expelled for at least one year."6 IDEA,
on the other hand, required that a disabled student "stay put" (in school
and perhaps even in the regular classroom if the student has been
"included") during ongoing disputes about placement, with limited
exceptions. Although the Gun-Free Schools Act provided that it should
be interpreted in a manner consistent with IDEA, 68 the tension between
the two statutes was obvious. Later in 1994, Congress enacted the
Jeffords Amendment to the Improving America's School Act of 1994,
which attempted to reconcile the conflicting requirements for schools by
allowing for an interim alternative educational placement for up to forty-
five days. 69 This provision specifically limited the application of IDEA's
stay-put provision while the due process proceedings took place, but only
for students who brought a "firearm" (not a knife or other weapon) to
school.' If the parents continued to object to any change in placement
and the due process proceedings lasted more than forty-five days, the
student would remain in the interim placement if the school desired. 7'
After the Honig decision, some courts determined that IDEA protec-
tions were applicable even to students who had not yet been determined
as having a disability. One court noted its concern that schools could
circumvent IDEA's restrictions by refusing to identify students as
disabled. The court stated that the "broad language" used by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Honig left "the unmistakable impression that all
disabled students, whether or not possessing 'previously identified
164. DeBenedictis, supra note 135, at A9 (quoting Judge Judith N. Keep of the Southern District
of California).
165. Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3907 (1994).
166. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 8921-8923 (1994).
167. The exceptions were for suspensions of less than 10 days, for misconduct that is unrelated to
the disability (in some jurisdictions), and in cases where the school goes to court to get permission
through an injunction to expel a "truly dangerous" student. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 326
(1988); see also Zirkel, supra note 161, at 569 (describing exceptions).
168. See 20 U.S.C. § 892 1(c).
169. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3)(B) (1994).
170. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3)(B)(iv) ("[Flor the purpose of this section, the term 'weapon' means a
firearm as such term is defined in section 921 of title 18.").
171. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3)(B)(iii).
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exceptional needs,' are entitled to the procedural protections afforded
under the IDEA."'72 Other courts pointed out, however, that a student
who was not disabled could use the IDEA protections for his or her own
benefit,W '73 to "forestall any attempts at routine discipline" and "disrupt[]
the educational goals of an already over-burdened and of times classified
as a chaotic public school system."'74
The upshot is that disabled status, or even claiming disabled status,
could result in'at least two significant disciplinary benefits. 75 Because of
the stay-put provision, the discipline action would be delayed while the
administrative and court procedures take place. 76 Moreover, the possible
disciplinary sanction would be less severe, because a disabled student (or
a student in the process of being evaluated) could not be expelled.'77
In some jurisdictions, however, the benefits were even more striking.
At least one court interpreted IDEA as prohibiting schools from filing
juvenile court petitions for criminal acts perpetrated by disabled
students. 7 Because filing a petition in the juvenile court was deemed a
change in placement, the school was prohibited from doing so until all
the time-consuming and expensive IDEA procedural requirements for a
change in placement were completed. 79 These procedural requirements
involve holding an IEP meeting to discuss and analyze any placement
change, and may include parental challenges before a hearing officer,
district court, and appellate courts and, of course, include the stay-put
172. Hacienda La Puente Sch. Dist. v. Honig, 976 F.2d 487,494 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Richard
v. City of Medford, 924 F. Supp. 320, 322 (D. Mass. 1996) (agreeing with Ninth Circuit in Hacienda
that student's "status was fixed at the time that a special needs evaluation should have been done").
173. See M.P. v. Governing Bd. of Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F. Supp. 1044, 1047
(S.D. Cal. 1994). The student was a senior in high school facing expulsion for bringing a firearm
onto school grounds and then enlisting the help of another student to hide the gun. Because IDEA's
hearing process takes several months to complete, even if the student is ultimately found to be not
disabled, "by invoking IDEA the [student] will achieve the goal of graduating with his class." Id. at
1049; see also Ramsingh, supra note 50, at 172-75 (pointing out how students can avoid discipline
by asking to be identified as disabled and invoking stay-put provision).
174. Rodiriecus L. v. Waukegan Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 249, 253-54 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that
student must show that school knew or should have known of disability).
175. See Bryant, supra note 65, at 498.
176. See id
177. See id (noting that student cannot be expelled for conduct related to disability, and "perhaps
even for conduct not related to the disability").
178. See Morgan v. Chris L., 21 IDELR 783 (E.D. Tenn. 1994).
179. See id
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provision."' In Morgan v. Chris L.,' 8' the Eastern District Court of
Tennessee stated that the filing of a petition in Juvenile Court (for
vandalism of school property) was an initiation of a change in placement
similar to a disciplinary action that would expel or suspend a student for
more than ten days.'82 The Sixth Circuit affirmed.'83 The court ordered
the school to withdraw the petition to the juvenile court, stating that the
filing of the petition by the school was a violation of IDEA and that the
juvenile court had also failed to follow IDEA procedures.18
School officials claimed that the court had allowed schools to become
a "lawless zone" for disabled students, pointing out that if a disabled
student committed a crime on the street, he could certainly be charged.'85
The counsel for the disabled student pointed out that nothing precluded a
private victim-a teacher or another student-from initiating juvenile
court proceedings.'86
IV. THE NEW IDEA AMENDMENTS AND REGULATIONS
Discipline was both the "top concern' 87 and the "most contentious
issue"'88 when Congress sought to reauthorize the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act-a process that began in 1995 and culminated
in the IDEA amendments of 1997.189 As Congress considered any
changes it would make to IDEA during reauthorization, it became
apparent in the committee hearings that discipline was a significant issue.
The committee hearings described below give some sense of the
180. See supra Part II.A. Under Honig, if a school official believes the disabled student is "truly
dangerous," the school may go to court to ask for an injunction that removes the student from
school. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 326 (1988).
181. 21 IDELR 783 (E.D. Tenn. 1994).
182. See id.
183. See Morgan v. Chris L., 106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision).
184. The court also chastised the school for procedural mistakes, including failing to identify the
student's disability in a timely fashion and failing to notify parents fully about the purpose of a
multidisciplinary hearing. See id.
185. Zirkel, supra note 161, at 569.
186. See id.
187. Robert Greene, Revised Law on Disabled Students Hard to Follow, Athens Daily
News/Athens Banner-Herald, July 5, 1998, at 5C.
188. How to Get Regular Education Peers off Your Back and on Your Side, Special Educator,
Aug. 4, 1995, at 10.
189. See Joetta L. Sack, Delay of Rules Leaves Schools in Doubt on IDEA, Educ. Wk., Mar. 10,
1999, at 1.
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problems addressed and the passion with which each side views the
issue. Although some of the testimony before Congress amounts to
anecdotes about the consequences of restrictions on discipline and
rhetoric about discrimination by school officials absent IDEA, it bears
careful study because it reveals the strong lines that have been drawn on
each side of this complicated issue. 90
The issue of school discipline and the disabled student involves
balancing the school's need for discipline and the disabled student's need
for an education.'9 1 Congress faced the question whether the statute as
written maintained an appropriate balance. Teachers and school
administrators contended it did not. "Almost every school district has a
story about the problems of disciplining children with disabilities-the
wild kindergartner who disrupts classes for everyone else but cannot
legally be removed from class, or the gang of youngsters caught selling
drugs in which all are expelled except the one diagnosed with a
disability.' 912 Teachers claimed they were increasingly frustrated when
school districts were unable or reluctant to act in the face of severe
behavioral problems and instead meted out light punishments of two or
three days suspension for violent acts against teachers. 93 Because the
inclusion movement has resulted in more and more students with
significant emotional and behavioral problems being moved from
residential settings and special education classrooms into the regular
general education classrooms, teachers in the regular classrooms are now
"confronted with situations and behaviors which are totally outside their
experience and preparation."'" Teachers recounted incidents of assault
and battery including incidents in which a teacher's arm was broken by a
disabled student and a teacher repeatedly suffered blows, several of
which left open wounds and one of which required a visit to an
190. As one commentator stated, "Overhaul of [IDEA] ... is tailor-made for policy decision by
anecdote. The facts and figures are sparse and conflicting; the horror stories are stark and vivid. And
the interests groups are well organized, disciplined and loaded with heart-tuggers or spine-chillers,
depending on their legislative goal." Stanfield, supra note 9, at 2102.
191. See Federal Disability Policy Hearings, supra note 22, at 56 (statement of Nancy L. Jones).
192. Applebome, supra note 19, at 8. For example, in Hope, Arkansas, three high school
students-one with learning disabilities-robbed a pawnshop, beat the owner, and brought stolen
guns to a school basketball game. All three were arrested, but only two could be expelled. The
school district was required to send a tutor to jail for the next year to educate the disabled student.
See Kronholz, supra note 17, at A24.
193. See Federal Disability Policy Hearings, supra note 22, at 70 (statement of Marcia Reback).
194. Id. at 69.
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emergency room.'95 In testimony before a Senate committee, one teacher
revealed that a new syndrome has emerged, "battered-teacher
syndrome," where teachers have come to believe that "being pummeled,
bitten, spit at, pushed, and assaulted in a myriad of other ways is an
expected part of the job."'96
School officials claimed that being required to go to court every time a
student with disabilities exhibited dangerous or seriously disruptive
behavior at school was an unsatisfactory method for dealing with
discipline problems.'97 Even if the balance struck by Congress was
appropriate in 1975 when IDEA was first passed, society had changed
significantly since that time, and the school environment was
dramatically different. Advocates for school officials pointed out that the
schools of the 1990s are increasingly confronted with serious
misconduct, including rape, murder, and physical and sexual assault, as
well as drug use and the destruction of property.' 98 In addition, the full-
inclusion movement has exacerbated the problem because more and
more disabled students with severe behavioral problems have been
placed in regular classes. To effect a change to a more restrictive
environment-for example, a special education class-because of
discipline problems may involve lawyers and courts if the parents
object.'99 And because many courts have tacitly accepted the premises of
the full-inclusion movement, parents believe that challenges are likely
to succeed and therefore may be more willing to object to a change in
placement to a more restrictive environment. Using the courts is
expensive for schools and parents alike, and the adversarial nature of a
court proceeding makes it highly unlikely that the school and parents will
later be able to cooperate to develop a program for the disabled
student.2 ' In addition, the educators in the schools believed that they
195. See id. at 70-71.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 90 (statement of Charles L. Weatherly).
198. See id. at 88. In short, significant changes have affected the educational environment since
IDEA was passed. See Rachelson, supra note 158, at 134. Census Bureau statistics indicate that
juvenile arrests for aggravated assault and murder have each increased 100% from 1975 to 1995. See
id. (citing Bureau of the Census, Pub. No. 323, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1995, at
206). Weapons possession charges increased almost 200% in that time. See id.
199. See Federal Disability Policy Hearings, supra note 22, at 90 (statement of Charles L.
Weatherly).
200. See Dupre, supra note 9, at 775.
201. See Federal Disability Policy Hearings, supra note 22, at 90-91 (statement of Charles L.
Weatherly).
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were in a better position than judges in courtrooms to determine if a
serious problem existed in the school environment.2 2
Finally, Congress expanded the definition of disability from that first set
forth in 1975. In 1983 Congress replaced the term "seriously emotionally
disturbed" with the broader term "behaviorally disordered."2 3 Again, in
1990, Congress expanded the definition to include traumatic brain
condition, autistic condition, and attention deficit disorder.2" Moreover,
the number of students diagnosed with learning disabilities has increased
dramatically in the past twenty years.205
Advocates for the disabled pointed out that IDEA was passed in 1975
"to address the national failure to provide disabled children educational
opportunity that had been long considered the right of every other
American child."20 6 One advocate maintained that no changes were
needed to the existing law because schools frequently try to exclude
disabled students under the guise of "serious behavioral" concerns and
violence.0 7 The same advocate claimed, somewhat inconsistently, that
there were few reported cases where schools had gone to court to remove
a violent disabled student from school, contending that this showed that
there were few cases where schools could demonstrate sufficient danger
or where parents would not consent to a change in placement.2 ' Creating
an exception for disruptive behavior was also rejected, as "school
personnel should continue to work with parents to develop alternative
202. See id. at 91.
203. H.IL Rep. No. 98-410, at 92 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2088,213 1.
204. See M.R. Rep. No. 101-544, at 4-6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1723, 1726-28.
Controversy continues to surround the diagnosis of Attention Deficit Disorder. See Rachelson, supra
note 158, at 137-39.
205. See Anne P. Dupre, Kelman and Lester's Jumping the Queue: An Inquiry into the Legal
Treatment of Students with Learning Disabilities, 49 J. Legal Educ. 302 (1999) (book review); Joetta
Sack, Report Charts Rise in Spec. Ed Enrollment, Educ. Wk., Mar. 17, 1999, at 40. The category of
disability that includes attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder saw a 20.5% increase from 1995-96
to 1996-97. See id
206. Federal Disability Policy Hearings, supra note 22, at 97 (statement of Kathleen Boundy,
Co-Director, Center for Law and Education).
207. Id
208. See id at 100; see also supra text accompanying note 192. But see Kronholz, supra note 17,
at A24 (describing teachers' union study that stated that 4712 criminal incidents were committed
against teachers in New York City in one year (assaults, sex offenses, robberies) and that half were
committed by special education students).
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strategies."" Moreover, even children who were not yet identified as
disabled should be able to seek the protection of IDEA."' In an oft-used
expression, advocates claimed that changing the IDEA protections would
"turn back the clock" to a time when school officials could deny disabled
students a full and appropriate education.21'
Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), considered the Senate's strongest
disability advocate, balked at proposals by school representatives that
would allow school officials to remove students based on what educators
considered dangerous behavior. 12  Senator Harkin contended that
"dangerous" behavior could not be defined objectively in a manner that
would not discriminate against disabled students.1 3 He stated that
"history is replete with examples of schools using discipline as an
excuse" to exclude students with disabilities who had behavior
problems.24 Thus, he also claimed that change would "turn the clock
back 20 years."2 5 Other senators, like Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash.),
supported a ninety-day interim placement for students who brought
weapons to school, physically or sexually assaulted school staff or other
students, possessed or distributed illegal drugs, or who were seriously
disruptive.2 6
The Department of Education weighed in with its own proposal. The
Department made only two suggestions: (1) expand the Jeffords Amend-
ment to include weapons other than firearms and (2) authorize hearing
officers to issue the so-called "Honig injunctions" to allow removal of
dangerous students after the allowable ten-day suspension." 7 Education
209. Federal Disability Policy Hearings, supra note 22, at 101 (statement of Kathleen Boundy).
Disability advocates claim that designating students as disabled or disruptive was used in the past to
expel students with disabilities. See Stanfield, supra note 9, at 2103.
210. See Federal Disability Policy Hearings, supra note 22, at 101-02 (statement of Kathleen
Boundy).
211. Id, at 101.
212. See Are You Ready for This?: Major Changes Loom in IDEA Reauthorization, Special
Educator, Aug. 4, 1995, at 11.
213. Id. at 12.
214. Id.
215. Id. Some might argue that there were some things about the public schools of 20 years ago
that would be good to recreate. There is also an analogy here to the racial affirmative action debate:
that affirmative action is needed because without it we will return to the "bad old days." Senator
Harkin increased the rhetoric of the debate by stressing, "'I'll stand on the Senate floor for a long,
long time' to oppose changes that will 'undo IDEA."' Id.
216. See id.
217. Id. at 10-11.
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Secretary Richard Riley acknowledged that the proposals would not be
entirely satisfactory to either school officials or the disabled
community.
18
Breaking a two-year deadlock, the House and Senate finally passed
the new amendments, and President Clinton signed the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997 into law on June 4,
1997.219 The bill was passed in an unusual manner with sponsors working
to move it quickly so that advocates for schools and the disabled would
be unable to mobilize against parts of the bill that they opposed.22° Some
senators decided that this process should be a model for how
controversial bills should be handled."
The amendments to IDEA are "numerous and substantive," repre-
senting a "significant change" to some aspects of federal special
education law.' For example, the new amendments added a section to
the provision setting forth the statute's purpose. The stated purpose of
IDEA is no longer merely to ensure that disabled students have access to
a free appropriate education,' but to '!prepare them for employment and
independent living."'2 4 Although the amendments were supposed to make
it clearer how disabled students may be disciplined under federal law,
teachers and school administrators were more uncertain than ever how to
respond to discipline problems that involve a disabled student.' More
than a year after the new amendments were passed, the regulations
implementing the law had yet to be issued. Although the process of
218. See id. at 11.
219. The House passed the bill by a 420-3 vote; the Senate vote was 98-1. See IDEA Bill Passes
Senate, Clearedfor Clinton's Signature, Congress Daily, May 14, 1997. A Senate amendment that
would have given school officials more authority to discipline was defeated 51-48. See id.
220. See id
221. See a Surely, the opposite argument also has some force.
222. Huefner, supra note 21, at 1103; see also Bryant, supra note 65, at 491 (calling changes
"substantial" and "sweeping"). Although the amendments deal with eligibility, evaluation, IEPs,
private placements, discipline, funding, attorneys fees, and alternative dispute resolution, this Article
focuses only on the discipline provisions.
223. The statute previously stated, "It is the purpose of this chapter to assure that all children with
disabilities have available to them.., a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special
education and related services designed to meet their unique needs ...." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)
(1994).
224. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 111 1997) (emphasis added).
225. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 187, at 5C; Sack, supra note 189, at 23 (quoting school
superintendent as stating that discipline amendments are "an inherent problem that creates
confusion, frustrations, and anger").
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issuing regulations rarely ignites the same passions as the passage of a
law, IDEA proved an exception, highlighting the struggle between
schools and disability-rights advocates.226 The Proposed Regulations
issued by the Department of Education in October 1997 caused an
uproar. "As soon as they went public, people went ballistic. '227 After the
ninety-day comment period, the Department had received more than
4500 written comments, many of them concerning the proposed
regulations on discipline, and more than fifty letters were from members
of Congress.228 Congress even held hearings in April 1998, where some
members chastised the Department for exceeding the letter and spirit of
the law and overregulating IDEA.229 Members also were displeased that
the Department did not consult with Congress as it wrote the proposed
regulations.230
It was not until almost one year after the April 1998 hearings-nearly
two years after the amendments were passed-that the Department of
Education unveiled the final regulations for the amended IDEA. 3 Many
educators and lawmakers saw the delay as another sign of
"unresponsiveness to the day-to-day needs of schools."
232
226. See Sack, supra note 189, at 23.
227. Clare Kittredge, For Special Ed Advocates, Rumor Is a Call to Arms, Boston Globe (New
Hampshire Wkly.), Apr. 26, 1998, at 1 (quoting Mark Joyce, Executive Director of the New
Hampshire School Administrators' Association). Mr. Joyce stated, "We've been calling legislators
saying they [the proposed regulations issued by the Department of Education] went far beyond the
law. They are just too burdensome and intrusive to the operation of schools." Id.
228. See Examining the Dept. of Education's Development of Regulations Necessary to
Implement the IDEA Amendments of 1997 (Public Law 105-17): Joint Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the House Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 105th
Cong. 76 (Apr. 22, 1998) [hereinafter Hearing on Proposed Regulations] (statement of Judith E.
Heumann, Assistant Secretary for Special Education and Rehabilitative Services). See infra note 232
where Secretary of Education Richard Riley states that the Department of Education received 6000
comments on the proposed rules.
229. See Hearing on Proposed Regulations, supra note 228, at 3 (statement of Honorable William
F. Goodling, Chairman of Committee on Education and the Workforce).
230. See id. at 15 (statement of Honorable Frank Riggs, Chairman of Subcommittee on Early
Childhood, Youth, and Families).
231. See 34 C.F.R. pts. 300, 303 (1999).
232. Sack, supra note 189, at 1. Education Department officials claim the additional time was
necessary to review the unprecedented number of comments that were received regarding the
proposed rules. See id. at 23. At a House hearing on February 11, 1999, Secretary of Education
Richard Riley noted that federal officials traveled to different parts of the country to get advice to
deal with 6000 comments on the proposed rules. See id.
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The next section sets forth the new amendments and regulations. The
section immediately following critically evaluates whether the amend-
ments will be effective in achieving their asserted purpose.
A. Restrictions on Discipline
The statute allows school officials unilaterally to remove disabled
students from the classroom in only a limited number of situations and
for only a limited time. In essence, the school may suspend a disabled
student using only the Goss v. Lopez protections (available to all
students) for up to ten days. The new statutory language raises a
significant issue, however, regarding whether schools must provide
educational services to students during these short-term suspensions. The
school may also remove a student to an "appropriate interim alternative
educational setting" for up to forty-five days for more serious behavior.
As discussed below, the circumstances under which a student can be
removed to an interim alternative educational setting are also limited and
subject to IDEA procedural protections.
1. Ten-Day Suspension
The Honig decision is reflected in the statute, allowing school officials
to suspend disabled students for up to ten days. 3 Recall that the Honig
Court had concluded that suspensions for less than ten days were not a
change in placement,"4 leading to a Department of Education policy that
educational services are not required for such short-term suspensions?
The new statutory language indicates that a suspension for less than ten
days is a change in placement.236 Despite the statutory language, how-
ever, the new IDEA regulations state that a change of placement occurs
only when the student is removed- for more than ten consecutive school
233. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 1111997).
234. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 325-26 (1988) (basing its conclusion on Department of
Education determination that suspensions of less than 10 days were not change in placement).
235. See OSEP Letter of Aug. 1, 1996,25 IDELR 513 (1996) (stating that school districts are not
required to provide educational services for suspensions of less than 10 days).
236. See id. Section 1415(k)(1)(A)(i) states: "School personnel under this section may order a
change in the placement of a child with a disability-to an appropriate alternative interim
educational setting, another setting, or suspension, for not more than 10 school days." (emphasis
added).
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days or when the student is subject to a series of removals that
"constitute a pattern., 237
Moreover, another new provision in the 1997 amendments provides
that a free appropriate public education must be "available to all children
with disabilities . . . including [students] who have been suspended or
expelled from school.', 3' This is an important change for schools in those
jurisdictions where courts had determined that schools could cease
services for students who are suspended or expelled for conduct
unrelated to their disability. 239 Again, despite statutory language that
seems clear, the regulations state that schools do not need to provide
educational services during the first ten-day suspension in a school year.
An attorney for a disabled student who is not provided educational
services for the initial ten-day suspension would surely argue that this
regulation is invalid, because it conflicts with the plain language of the
statute.
The school is also permitted to place the disabled student in an interim
alternative educational setting for the ten days, thus avoiding the
services-during-suspension issue. But the school can do so only "to the
extent such alternatives would be applied to [students] without
disabilities."24 A school that attempts to place a disabled student with a
behavior disorder in a more restrictive special education classroom for
forty-five days to better meet his or her needs may be unable to do so if
this particular strategy is not used with nondisabled students.
The statute does not address serial suspensions. The regulations state
that a series of suspensions or removals which aggregate more than ten
school days in a year does not constitute a change in placement
triggering additional procedures unless this constitutes a "pattern"
because of factors such as "the length of each removal, the total amount
237. 34 C.F.R. § 300.519 (1999).
238. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1997) (emphasis added).
239. See, e.g., Department ofEduc. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that plain
language of IDEA does not condition receipt of funding on providing services to disabled students
expelled for serious misconduct unrelated to their disabilities); supra note 97 and accompanying text
(describing other cases). One court, realizing that it had decided that expelled students need not
receive educational services without considering the new amendments, amended its opinion, stating
that this rule applied only to cases initiated before the 1997 amendments were enacted. See Doe v.
Board ofEduc., 115 F.3d 1273, 1283 (7th Cir. 1997). The court acknowledged, however, that in the
future, school districts must provide educational services to disabled students. See id.
240. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(A)(i).
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If school authorities wish to remove a disabled student from the
classroom for over ten days, the student must be placed in an "interim
alternative educational setting."242 This removal to an alternative
educational setting can occur only under the limited circumstances that
are described below.
a. Weapons and Drugs
Keeping, at least in part, some of the features of the Gun-Free Schools
Act and the 1994 Jeffords Amendment,243 the 1997 amendments allow
schools to discipline disabled students who bring a weapon to school.
The 1997 Amendments expand the covered behavior beyond "guns" to
"weapons" and include some drug offenses, but Senator Gorton's
proposal that would have included assault on school personnel was not
enacted. The statute allows school officials to move a disabled student to
an "appropriate interim alternative educational setting" for not more than
forty-five days, but only if the student (1) carries a weapon to school or a
school function or (2) possesses or uses illegal drugs or sells or solicits
the sale of a controlled substance while at school or a school function. 2'
The statute nowhere defines what kind of interim alternative setting
would be "appropriate." What is clear, however, is that the setting must
be educational. The regulations set forth more explicit requirements for
the interim setting: the interim setting must (1) allow the disabled student
to continue to progress in the general curriculum, (2) allow the child to
continue to receive the services and modifications that were set out in the
241. 34 C.F.R- § 300.519(b).
242. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(A)(i). For any misconduct, the school must first determine if the
behavior causing the removal was a manifestation of the student's disability. See infra notes 267-75
and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
244. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. 11 1997). IDEA expanded the coverage of the Jeffords
Amendment of 1994 beyond "gun or other firearm" to "dangerous weapon," which is defined as a
"weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, animate or inanimate, that is used for or is
readily capable of, causing death or serious bodily injury, except that such term does not include a
pocket knife with a blade of less than 2Y2 inches in length." 18 U.S.C. § 930(g)(2) (1994)
(incorporated by reference).
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student's IEP, and (3) include any additional services and modifications
that have been designed to prevent the misconduct from recurring.
245
The 1997 amendments add a new obligation for school districts. After
taking any of the disciplinary actions described above (appropriate
interim educational setting for ten days or forty-five days, suspension for
ten days), the student's IEP team must meet within ten days to develop a
behavioral intervention plan or review a plan that is already in place and
modify it to address the behavior.2 46 Although this statutory requirement
plainly applies whenever a disabled student is suspended for ten days or
less, 47 the regulations create an exception for such short-term
suspensions, an interpretation that seems to have no basis in the statute
and that is likely to be challenged in court. 8
The effect of the new IDEA amendments is simple: If two students-
one disabled and one nondisabled-are found with a gun at school,
Congress has mandated that they be treated differently. The nondisabled
student would be expelled for one year with no requirement that the
student receive any educational services under the requirements of the
Gun-Free Schools Act. 49 But the disabled student would be entitled to
IDEA procedural protections. The student may be placed in an
alternative interim educational placement for a maximum of forty-five
days, where the student must continue to receive the benefit of special
education services, access to the general curriculum, and a behavior
intervention plan designed to reduce the student's behavior disorder.
Schools may try to deal with this double standard by avoiding long
suspensions of any student,"' which in turn may contribute to a general
decline in order.
245. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.522 (1999). The IDEA regulations state that the interim alternative
setting must be determined by the IEP team. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.522. Because of the requirements
set forth in the regulations, home schooling may not be an appropriate interim setting.
246. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (Supp. 1111997).
247. The statute states, "Either before or not later than 10 days after taking a disciplinary action
described in subparagraph (A)," the IEP team must conduct an assessment or review. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(k)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added). Subparagraph A, as described above, provides in part that
school personnel may unilaterally suspend a disabled student for not more than 10 days. See 20
U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(A)(i).
248. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.520(b)(1)(i)-(ii) (1999).
249. See 20 U.S.C. § 8921(b)(1) (1994) ("[E]ach state receiving Federal funds under this chapter
shall have in effect a State law requiring local educational agencies to expel from school for a period
of not less than one year a student who is determined to have brought a weapon to a school.").
250. See Laura Mansnerus, Spare the Rod, and Then What?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1998, § 14, at 1.
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b. Violent Students
If the conduct of a violent disabled student is not covered by the
weapons and drug provision, school officials must request a hearing
officer for permission to remove a violent disabled student for up to
forty-five days to an appropriate interim alternative educational
setting." The statute makes no provision to allow school officials to
remove a severely disruptive student who is not violent. The use of a
hearing officer, however, is a change from the pre-amendment
requirement set forth in Honig that schools must petition a court when
seeking to remove a dangerous student from his or her placement.
In addition, the 1997 amendments add a new "substantial evidence"
requirement 52 The school must demonstrate by "substantial evidence ''
that the disabled student is "substantially likely" to injure himself or
others.' The statute defines "substantial evidence" as "beyond a
preponderance of the evidence." 5
The hearing officer must also consider the appropriateness of the
student's current placement and whether the school has made reasonable
efforts to minimize the risk of harm in the student's current placement,
including the use of supplementary aids and services. If the current
placement is deemed to be "inappropriate" or the school has not made
reasonable efforts to minimize the risk of harm, it appears-at least from
the legislative history-that the hearing officer must deny the school's
request to move the student to an alternative setting. 6 What efforts will
be deemed reasonable under the statute is left for further elucidation by
courts.
251. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(2) (Supp. 11 1997).
252. Honig required that the school show that it was "substantially likely" that injury would
result. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 328 (1988). The new amendments added the requirement that
the school show by "substantial evidence" that it is "substantially likely" that injury will result 20
U.S.C. § 1415(k)(2)(A).
253. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(10)(C) (Supp. 1H 1997).
254. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(2)(A).
255. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(10)(C).
256. The Senate Report from the Committee on Labor and Human Resources states that in such a
case, "the appropriate response by an impartial hearing officer is to deny the school district's request
to move the child to an alternative- setting," as the problems "can be addressed in the current
placement." S. Rep. No. 105-17, at 29 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 107. Of course,
cases may arise where placement may be deemed inappropriate because of curricular needs. Even
with changes to make the placement "appropriate" for curricular matters, however, violent behavior
simply may be more difficult to subdue, even with reasonable efforts to reduce the risk of harm.
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Finally, the statute sets forth "additional requirements" for the altema-
tive setting."" The hearing officer must determine whether the alternative
setting would enable the student to continue to participate in the general
curriculum and to receive services and modifications set out in the IEP,
and whether the services and modifications set out in the IEP will
address the behavioral problem so that it does not recur." 8 This provision
will require the school to present evidence at the hearing regarding how
this can and will be accomplished in the alternative setting.
Thus, a parent may challenge any change in placement to an alterna-
tive setting on a number of grounds. First, the parent can contend that the
school did not present "substantial evidence" that the violent child is
"substantially likely" to injure himself or others. Next, the parent can
contend that the school did not provide enough supplementary aids and
services to minimize the risk that the disabled student's behavior will
cause harm. Finally, the parent can contend that the school has not
demonstrated that the interim alternative education placement meets all
the requirements set forth in the statute and its regulations.
If the school can demonstrate all of the above, the hearing officer may
order a change in placement for a violent disabled student to an interim
alternative setting for up to forty-five days. The Analysis of Comments
and Changes to the regulations states that the statute does not limit the
number of times the procedure may be invoked if the school desires an
extension during an appeal regarding the interim placement itself or
while a due process hearing proceeds regarding a more permanent
change of placement.259 The parent may file an action in district court if
the parent disagrees with the hearing officer's determination.2
c. Staying Put in the Alternative Placement
If a parent challenges the interim alternative educational placement for
a weapons or drug violation or for violent conduct, a complex "stay-put"
provision kicks in while the appeal proceeds. The new amendments
change the stay-put provision that was in place (for students with guns)
257. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(3)(B) (Supp. III 1997). These requirements apply to placement in an
alternative setting under the weapons and drugs provision and under the violent student provision.
258. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(3)(B)(i)-(ii).
259. See 34 C.F.R. pts. 300 and 303, Attachment 1, Analysis of Comments and Changes, 64 Fed.
Reg. 12,628 (1999).
260. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(6)(A)(i) (Supp. III 1997).
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after the Gun-Free Schools Act. Previously, at least for bringing a gun to
school, the student remained in the alternative placement even if the
appeals process took more than forty-five days.26" ' According to the 1997
amendments, if a parent challenges the alternative placement for either
the weapons or drug offenses or for violent conduct, the student will
remain in the alternative placement until the appeals process is
completed or until the forty-five days are up, whichever comes first.262 If
the school wants to keep the student in the alternative placement beyond
the forty-five days until the appeals process is complete, the school must
request an expedited hearing.26 The statute restricts the school to only
one argument at this hearing: the school must show that putting the
student back in the original placement would be dangerous." To keep
the student in the alternative setting, the school must meet the same
burden that the statute set forth to remove violent students to the alter-
native placement-substantial evidence that the student is substantially
likely to injure himself or others.265 In addition, as in the initial placement
decision, the school must show that it considered the appropriateness of
the student's current placement (the placement before the alternative
setting); made reasonable efforts to reduce the risk of harm in that
placement (including use of supplementary aids and services); and
determined whether the alternative setting would enable the student to
continue to participate in the general curriculum and to receive services
and modifications set out in the IEP.2
B. The Manifestation Determination
Misbehavior that is a manifestation of a student's disability is to be
treated differently from misbehavior that is unrelated to the disability.
This distinction follows the pattern set by pre-amendment court
opinions. The new amendments add a section addressing how to tell if
the bad conduct is a manifestation of the student's disability and what a
school is allowed to do if it is not.
261. See OSEP Memorandum 95-16,22 IDELR 531 (OSEP Apr. 26, 1995).
262. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(7)(A) (Supp. 11I 1997).
263. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(7)(C)(i) (Supp. 11I 1997).
264. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(7)(C)(i).
265. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(7)(C)(ii) (referring to § 1415(k)(2)).
266. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(2) (Supp. 111 1997).
267. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
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The statute provides that after every decision to take any disciplinary
action allowed by the statute, or for any change of placement for more
than ten days for any other misbehavior, the IEP team must meet within
ten days.268 The statute sets forth the steps the IEP team must take in
chronological order. The team must first consider evaluation and
diagnostic results, including any relevant information provided by the
parents, observations of the student, and the child's current IEP and
placement. The team must next determine "in relationship to the
behavior subject to the disciplinary action," whether the IEP and
placement were appropriate and whether special education services,
supplementary aids and services, and behavior intervention strategies
were provided consistent with the IEP and placement. The IEP team
must consider "all relevant information," including "evaluation and
diagnostic results" or "other relevant information supplied by the
parents," observations of the student, and the student's IEP placement.
269
The statute for the first time sets forth a standard for determining if a
disabled student's misconduct was a manifestation of the student's
disability. To make this determination, the IEP team, after completing
the steps outlined above, must decide whether the student's disability
"impair[ed]" the student's "ability... to understand the impact and
consequences of the behavior" and whether "the disability impair[ed]"
the student's "ability... to control the behavior."27 The statute gives no
clue as to how to weigh the above factors but merely states that if, after
review, the IEP team decides that the behavior was not a manifestation of
the disability, the student may be disciplined in the same way as a
student without disabilities. 27 ' As noted above,272 another provision in the
new amendments requires that a free appropriate education must be
"available to all children with disabilities ... including [students] who
have been suspended or expelled from school." '273 Thus, even if a student
can be removed from the classroom because the conduct is deemed
unrelated to the disability, education services must still be provided to
the student.
268. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4)(A)(ii) (Supp. I 1997). See supra notes 233-58 and
accompanying text for a discussion of disciplinary action allowed by IDEA.
269. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4)(C) (Supp. 1111997); 34 C.F.R. § 300.523 (1999).
270. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4)(C)(ii).
271. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5)(A) (Supp. 1111997).
272. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
273. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1997).
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Again, despite the plain statutory language that requires a manifes-
tation determination review each time a school authority contemplates a
disciplinary action including a suspension or removal for less than ten
days, the regulations do not require a manifestation review for
suspensions or removal for less than ten days when these actions do not
constitute an improper pattern. 4 The Department of Education may be
correct that manifestation review for these short-term suspensions would
have little utility and would be burdensome.27 Nonetheless, Congress
called for such a review, making this issue ripe for litigation.
1. Challenging and Staying Put During the Manifestation
Determination
The statute specifically allows parents to request an expedited hearing
if they disagree with the manifestation determination (or any decision
regarding placement). At that hearing the school has the burden of
demonstrating that the behavior was not a manifestation of the
disability.276 If the parent challenges the determination that the conduct
was not a manifestation of the disability, the statute then tracks the
complex scheme for placement during any hearing and court proceedings
that was described above in the section regarding parent challenges to the
interim alternative educational placement. 77 That is, the student will
remain in the interim alternative educational setting up to the forty-five-
day limit, unless the parents and the school agree otherwise.278 If the
challenge goes beyond forty-five days, the student is returned to the
original placement-the placement prior to the removal to the alternative
setting. As noted above, as the full-inclusion movement continues to gain
momentum, the original setting is likely to be the regular general
education classroom. The school can challenge the return of the student
only by requesting yet another expedited hearing and by showing by
substantial evidence that the student is dangerous-that placement is
"substantially likely to result in injury to the child or to others."
274. See 34 C.F.t. § 300.523.
275. See 34 C.F.R. pts. 300 and 303, Attachment 1, Analysis of Comments and Changes, 64 Fed.
Reg. 12,624 (1999).
276. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(6)(B)(i) (Supp. II 1997).
277. See supra notes 262-66 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
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C. Protecting Students Who Are Not Yet Eligible for Special Education
Even if a student has not yet been deemed eligible for special
education, the student may be treated as if he or she were disabled with
regard to school discipline. If a student violates a school's code of
conduct-including carrying a gun to school-the student may claim that
he or she cannot be disciplined as would a nondisabled student. The
student can claim all of the protections for disabled students described
above if the school "had knowledge" that the student had a disability
before the behavior occurred. According to the statute, the school shall
be deemed to have knowledge (1) if the parent expressed concern in
writing 79 or has requested evaluation of the child, (2) if the behavior or
performance of the child demonstrates that the child needs special
education services, or (3) if the teacher or other school personnel
expressed concern about the child to the director of special education or
to other school personnel.
280
D. Reporting
A state, if it chooses, may now require a local school to include
information in the student's records about disciplinary action taken
against the disabled student.28' These records may be transmitted in the
same way that such information is transmitted for nondisabled students.
The statute now makes clear that a school may report crimes
committed by a disabled student, and that reporting a crime is not an
event protected by IDEA.282 Law enforcement authorities may apply the
criminal law to crimes committed by a disabled student 283 and are
apparently allowed to change the educational placement of the student if
279. There is an exception for a parent who is illiterate or has a disability that prevents such
expression. It is not clear if both parents must be illiterate, what kind of disability would qualify as
preventing a parent from expressing concern, and whether the parent needs to have been identified as
disabled before making this claim. See Bryant, supra note 65, at 536.
280. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(B) (Supp. I1 1997). The regulations narrow the statutory
language in part (3) by adding the modifier "other personnel in accordance with the agency's
established child find or special education referral system." 34 C.F.R. § 300.527(b)(4) (1999).
281. See 20 U.S.C. § 1413(j) (Supp. 1111997).
282. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(9)(A) (Supp. 1111997).
283. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(9)(A). The school must send copies of the disciplinary records and
special education records for consideration by the appropriate authorities, see 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(k)(9)(B) (Supp. 1111997), but only in a manner that is consistent with the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.529(b)(2) (1999).
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incarceration is necessary. The statute is silent as to whether the
disciplinary protections remain in effect for the disabled student after the
crime is reported but while the law enforcement or judicial authorities
investigate and decide whether to assert jurisdiction or whether to take
the student into custody.
States must provide a free appropriate public education until a student
reaches his or her twenty-first birthday; this includes those from eighteen
to twenty-one who are in an adult correctional facility, if they were
identified as disabled before incarceration in the facility and have an
IEP.2" ' A student who had been identified as disabled and had received
services under an IEP must be afforded a free appropriate education and
related services while in prison, until age twenty-one, even if the student
had dropped out of school before incarceration.285
A number of provisions that had been requested by teachers were not
enacted. One proposal requested a ninety-day trial period for a change in
placement to see if a particular classroom environment was appropriate
for the disabled student.286 The classroom teacher would need to agree
before the placement could continue, but numerous interventions and
supports to help the student would be used during that time. Another
proposed revision would have given the principal of a school unilateral
power to act to remove a student if a student were considered danger-
ous.287 This particular proposal also dealt with disruptive students. If a
disabled student significantly and persistently disrupted a class, the
multidisciplinary IEP team would be empowered to change the student's
placement without the parent's permission.288 Despite the proposal to
address disruptive students in the amendments on discipline, disruptive
students are not covered in IDEA at all.
284. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. IMI 1997). State law may require that these students
need not be provided with a free appropriate public education if they had not been identified as
disabled and did not have an IEP in the last educational placement before incarceration. See 34
C.F.R. § 300.122(a)(2)(i)(A)-(B) (1999). A school may discontinue services for disabled students
who graduate from high school with a regular high school diploma, but this graduation is a change in
placement that triggers IDEA's notice provision. See 34 C.F.1L § 300.122(a)(3) (1999).
285. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.122(a)(2)(ii)(A) (1999).
286. See Federal Disability Policy Hearings, supra note 22, at 72 (statement of Marcia Reback)
(describing recommendations by American Federation of Teachers).
287. See id.
288. See id.; see also IDEA Bill Passes Senate, Cleared for Clinton's Signature, Cong. Daily,
May 14, 1997 (describing how amendment proposed by Senator Slade Gorton to give state and local
government more authority to discipline was defeated 51-48).
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Some educators were temperate in their criticism of the new law when
it was first enacted, stating that the amendments were better than the
existing law.289 Nonetheless, they pointed out that although the law
would handle "the most egregious cases," the "gray areas that affect most
teachers in most classrooms are still out there." '  Others were more
vehement in their criticism. After learning that a former special
education student could not be suspended for more than forty-five days
after he was sent home from school under the influence of marijuana and
he threatened to kill an assistant principal, one school board wrote a
scathing letter to state and federal leaders blasting the new discipline
procedures.29' Other teachers and principals claimed that the weapons
provision failed to address the major problem of special education
students who bite teachers and who hit teachers or each other with
fists.2 9
2
Less than a year after the 1997 IDEA amendments were enacted,
Senators Judd Gregg and Slade Gorton considered introducing the IDEA
Flexibility Amendment, which would have allowed schools more
flexibility in disciplining disabled students.293 Claiming that this change
would allow "kids with disabilities and their families to be discriminated
against because of their disability," advocates for the disabled
"bombarded" Senator Gregg's office with e-mail and telephone calls, and
he chose not the introduce the amendment.294
289. See David Hess & Elsa C. Amett, Disabled Student Conduct Targeted, Denver Post, May 14,
1997, at Al (giving reaction of Bruce Hunter, chief lobbyist for the American Association of School
Administrators, to House passage of bill and expected immediate passage by Senate).
290. Id.
291. See Ryan Underwood, Discipline Constraints Under Fire, Tennessean, Mar. 13, 1998, at
1W. A nondisabled student would have been suspended for one calendar year under the district's
zero-tolerance rules. See id.
292. See Kronholz, supra note 17, at A24 (describing concern of school principal who had
recently ordered hepatitis shot for teacher who was bitten by special education student).
293. See Kittredge, supra note 227, at 1. In addition, the Georgia School Boards Association has
lobbied Georgia congressmen to change the law, at least as regards the protections afforded disabled
students whose misconduct is not caused by the disability. See Doug Cumming, Special Ed. Law
Unfair, Critics Say, Atlanta J. & Const., Apr. 27, 1998, at Cl; see also Critics Calling Special
Education Law Unfair, Fla. Times-Union, Apr. 28, 1998, at B1.
294. Kittredge, supra note 227, at 1; see also Anderson, supra note 134, at 32 (quoting Michael
Horowitz, former general counsel at Office of Management and Budget as stating, "Any time we
tried to change [special education policy] we would be overwhelmed.").
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V. FROM THE FRYING PAN INTO THE FIRE?
The precise impact of the new amendments, like the impact of IDEA
after it was originally passed in 1975,295 will be revealed only as schools
implement the new provisions and the post-amendment cases start to
wind their way through the courts. But the amendments raise some
interesting questions about the dilemma of school discipline and the
disabled. This section examines some of these issues.
A. Double Standards and Discipline
1. The Disruptive Student
Disruptive students affect the learning of other students and can
demand a disproportionate amount of teacher time and energy.296 Indeed,
the effect on teachers and other students can be "overwhelmingly
negative. '  Yet the new IDEA amendments make no provision for
schools attempting to deal with disruptive students. Although disruptive
disabled students can inhibit the learning process in both special
education classrooms and regular education classrooms, the problem is
295. See Dupre, supra note 9, at 776 n.2 (quoting one educator in 1975 as stating that IDEA
would "change the American public school system more drastically than the 1954 Supreme Court
ruling on desegregation").
296. See Henry, supra note 3, at ID (citing poll of 1320 elementary school principals where 82%
said disciplining disruptive or dangerous disabled students requires too much time); cf. Cole v.
Greenfield-Cent. Community Schs., 657 F. Supp. 56, 62 (S.D. Ind. 1986) (stating that teacher had
duty to provide adequate educational experience to all students in classroom, not only to
mainstreamed disabled student).
297. Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. Number 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1994). In Clyde K.,
school officials had to go to court to change the placement of a 15-year-old boy with Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Tourette Syndrome whose severe behavioral problem included
name-calling and profanity in the classroom, kicking furniture, directing sexually explicit remarks to
female students, and numerous assaults. See id. The parents had refused to agree with the court's
recommendation that the student be removed from the regular classroom and placed in a more
restrictive self-contained educational program that was off-campus and that dealt specifically with
students with severe behavioral problems. See id The parents requested a due process hearing and
district court review, and appealed to the Ninth Circuit after the hearing office and the district court
agreed with the school that the appropriate placement for this student was the special program
recommended by the school. See id The Ninth Circuit agreed that the off-campus program
recommended by the school was the least restrictive environment where the student could be
educated satisfactorily, as required by DEA. See id at 1402. The school was required to litigate this
matter three times-using considerable economic and human resources-over two years. See id at
1402 n.10. On March 27, 1992, the parents requested a due process hearing; on March 23, 1993, the
parents appealed to the district court; the Ninth Circuit decision was rendered in 1994. The fee for
the school attorney alone exceeded $100,000. See id
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especially difficult for regular classroom teachers, who have no special
training in dealing with severe disabilities and who have a larger number
of students with varying academic abilities to teach and keep on task.29
Although school districts may hire a one-to-one teacher's aide for the
disabled student, these para-professionals are not even trained teachers
and may not have the skills to manage severe discipline problems.2 The
inclusion movement exacerbates the problem," ° as parents can fight
successfully to have a student with severe behavioral problems in a
regular classroom or in a regular school.3"'
The failure to focus attention on disruptive students appears to stem
from the notion that safety issues are serious problems, while learning
issues are not. Indeed, some advocates for the disabled insist that
discipline for safety reasons and discipline for learning are separate
issues because they claim disruption hurts no one.3 2 According to a
leading disability advocate, students "who [have] Tourette syndrome
might be disruptive in the classroom because of their behavior, but
they're not hurting anybody."3 3 To be sure, not all disruptive students
physically injure others. But it is absurd to suggest that students remain
unharmed when others interfere with their academic progress.
"Disruptive behavior is as injurious to the educational program of
[children] as dangerous behavior is to their safety."3"4 Learning is lost
each time a teacher stops a lesson to quell a disturbance. Although this
effect is perhaps the most obvious, the aftermath of disruption causes
even more loss of learning. Additional learning time is lost as the teacher
attempts to get the other students back on task after each disruption. In
addition, the teacher has less capacity to give other students individual
attention, because she or he must always keep an eye on the disruptive
student.
298. See Stanfield, supra note 9, at 2103 ("Most [regular classroom] teachers have neither the
training themselves nor the experienced aides and specialists to help them cope.").
299. See Hymowitz, supra note 10, at 27 (describing problems with paraprofessionals).
300. See Editorial, Behavioral Disorders, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 1, 1995, at 6B.
301. See Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1208 (3d Cir. 1993). The child's behavior
included repeated toileting accidents, temper tantrums, crawling and hiding under furniture, and
touching, hitting, and spitting on other children, the teacher, and the teacher's aide. See id.
302. See Kittredge, supra note 227, at 1.
303. Id. (quoting Jan Carlton, President of New Hampshire Learning Disabilities Association,
who stated that people get confused between "discipline and safety").
304. Stanfield, supra note 9, at 2104 (quoting Assistant Director of the Educational Issues
Department of American Federation of Teachers).
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More subtle effects creep in over time. A teacher who is constantly
dealing with disruption may be discouraged from trying a certain kind of
lesson for fear it may set off a response in the disruptive student. Dealing
with frequent disruption also is likely to lead to physical exhaustion, and
the teacher may simply have less energy and enthusiasm for the day-to-
day activities in the classroom. Other students may model the disruptive
behavior when they learn that this behavior has no severe consequences,
thus compounding the problem. 5 The harm from disruption does not
affect only nondisabled students. Nondisruptive disabled students who
must sit in a class with disruptive students also suffer when discipline
problems occur. Moreover, when a disabled student is disruptive, it must
certainly affect the academic benefit that the disabled student would
obtain from being in the regular classroom. °6
In response to critics who point out that the education of nondisruptive
students suffers if disruptive students cannot be removed to an alternative
setting, advocates for the disabled simply respond that "federal law
insists that provision be made for disabled students.""3 7 The suggestion
that "[n]obody seems to care very much about the other kids in the
classroom"3 ° appears to have some merit. Where disabled students have
advocates in congressional halls and in courtrooms who focus solely on
the needs of the disabled student, "[n]ondisabled kids stand without
advocates."3°9
2. The Violent Student
Although the IDEA amendments fail to acknowledge the problems
presented by the disruptive student, they do attempt to address school
305. See Dupre, supra note 9, at 826-29 (describing research regarding modeling). When
teachers see student misbehavior and fail to stop it, students perceive that the teacher is intimidated
and this encourages additional student misbehavior that might not otherwise occur. See Jackson
Toby, Getting Serious About School Discipline, Pub. Interest, Sept. 22, 1998, at 71 (noting how
minor student infractions contribute to sense of intimidation among teachers and encourage students
to challenge other, more sacred, rules).
306. See Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist Number 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1402 (9th Cir. 1994).
307. Mathews, supra note 146, at A5 (quoting Dale Mentink, attorney for Protection &
Advocacy, Inc., who represented disabled student who hit two staff members and classmate).
308. Inclusion: What to Do with the Disruptive Child, Am. Pol. Network Daily Rep. Card, Sept.
14, 1994, at 5 (quoting Peter Idstein, former elementary school principal).
309. Id. Even though school officials take the needs of the nondisabled student into account, they
must consider the needs of all students and must also take into account the mandates of the federal
law that focuses solely on the rights of the disabled child.
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discipline and the violent student. But the amendments fall short of
offering sufficient protection for nonviolent students and school staff. Put
simply, the statute requires that absent parental agreement, schools must
meet an exceedingly high standard before moving a violent student from
a classroom to an alternative placement. 10 Indeed, it is hard to think of
another instance where adults with direct responsibility for children are
prohibited by law from protecting those children unless a hearing officer
determines there is substantial evidence that it is substantially likely that
the children will be injured. "Substantial" evidence, though it falls
somewhat below the reasonable doubt standard, is not an easy standard
to meet. In fact, the statute defines "substantial" evidence as "beyond a
mere preponderance," or beyond fifty percent."' Given that definition of
"substantial evidence," it would appear that "substantially likely" means
that the school must show that there is a more than fifty-percent
likelihood that injury will occur before a violent student can be placed in
an alternative setting. 12 Yet school districts may be liable in a negligence
action for injuries inflicted by a violent student." 3 Moreover, the
amendments make no provision for a sliding scale of proof for severe
injury. For instance, if it were only thirty percent likely that injury would
occur, but the injury would be serious, the likelihood of injury would not
appear to rise to the "substantially likely" threshold?1 4
In addition, the statute does not delineate what type of injury will
count in the alternative placement determination. Courts should avoid
any invitation to rule that injury occurs for IDEA purposes "only when
blood is drawn or the emergency room visited."3 ' Injury from a punch or
310. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k) (Supp. III 1997).
311. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(10).
312. See Bryant, supra note 65, at 515 (explaining that statute could be interpreted this way).
313. See, e.g., Garufi v. School Bd., 613 So. 2d 1341, 1343 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993) (holding there
was genuine issue of fact as to whether school district breached duty to person injured on school
grounds by failing to protect her from student with extensive disciplinary history).
314. Although one pre-amendment opinion stated that even a five-percent likelihood of material
personal injury or an appreciable danger of serious personal injury makes injury "substantially
likely," see Clinton County R-III Sch. Dist. v. C.J.K., 896 F. Supp. 948, 950 (W.D. Mo. 1995), the
new statutory language would appear to preclude such an interpretation today. One can only wonder
how much this Missouri court's opinion, published in August 1995, was influenced by the well-
publicized murder of Christine Smetzer in early 1995. See, e.g., Diana Aitchison, A Student's
Murder Sparks Bitter Debate; Mainstreaming of Special Needs Students Under Fire in St. Louis,
Kansas City Star, Feb. 26, 1995, at BI; see also infra notes 384-89 and accompanying text
(describing facts of Christine Smetzer's death).
315. Light v. Parkway C-2 Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 1223, 1230 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting this standard).
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a push may be just as damaging to school discipline and learning as
injuries from a bite or a puncture from a pencil.
Physical injury is not the only kind of injury that can be inflicted on
other students and staff. Verbal insults, intimidation, sexual abuse, and
threats have been deemed to constitute injury in the employment
context."6 Words of intimidation, threat, or abuse can have a devastating
effect on the emotional well-being of a child who is the recipient of a
verbal assault. In particular, other disabled students may be the object of
insults because of their disability. The IDEA amendments fail to clarify
if verbal assault is included in the statutory requirement of "injury."
Ironically, yet another federal statute has led the Supreme Court to
assert that remarks by students that do not rise to the level of physical
injury can deprive a child of educational benefits." 7 At least when such
conduct is in the form of sexual harassment, schools officials now have
an obligation under Title IX to take action to stop the abuse or face a
damages action."' Thus, Title IX and IDEA together place schools in an
impossibly difficult situation. School officials who attempt to comply
with Title IX by removing an abusive disabled student to an alternative
setting will run up against the disciplinary restrictions of IDEA. A
"student's demand for a harassment-free classroom will conflict with the
alleged harasser's claim to a mainstream placement under [IDEA].""3 9
Moreover, IDEA-as Justice Kennedy recognized---"places strict limits
on the ability of schools to take disciplinary actions against students with
behavior disorder disabilities, even if the disability was not diagnosed
prior to the incident triggering discipline."32
Sexual abuse by disabled students is not limited merely to abuse of
other students. Teachers, aides, and school therapists are also victims of
sexual or physical abuse32" ' or improper sexual touching.3" Indeed, some
educators and commentators agree that the only way to ensure that
316. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
317. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
318. The plaintiff in Davis asked for $500,000 in damages. See idU at 1689 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); see also George F. Will, Six-Year-Old Harassers?, Newsweek, June 7, 1999, at 88.
319. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1690 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
320. Id at 1682 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Will, supra note 318, at 88.
321. See Lindberg, supra note 156, at 8 (describing sexual and physical assaults on teachers and
staff, some that left bruising).
322. See id. (describing numerous instances where disabled student grabbed genitals and buttocks
of teacher, aide, and occupational therapist).
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students and staff are protected when a violent student is thrust back into
the classroom may be to hire security guards.3"
Even if the likelihood-of-injury standard is met, the school must also
demonstrate that it made reasonable efforts to minimize the risk of harm
from the disabled student. The determination of what kinds of efforts are
"reasonable" to minimize the risk of harm from a violent student is left
open, a clear invitation for litigation. The wording of the statute may cut
two ways. It provides that the hearing officer must consider whether the
school "has made reasonable efforts,"324  a search into past
decisionmaking. One commentator has pointed out that this factor is
likely to convince courts to determine that because the behavior
continued, past efforts inevitably have not been reasonable, and the
school would then be forced to deal with a dangerous student outside the
alternative placement. 25
This interpretation seems unduly strict, as the statute's requirement of
"reasonable" efforts could also be interpreted to mean that inquiry into
these efforts (by a hearing officer or a judge) must consider the child's
previous behavior patterns and the information that was available at the
time the misconduct occurred. For example, if the conduct initiating the
discipline had not been exhibited previously, the school's failure to
address the behavior might be reasonable. But if the conduct initiating
the discipline had been exhibited previously, parents could challenge any
intervention the school attempted as not being a reasonable attempt to
minimize the risk of harm to others, a challenge that will take
considerable time and resources to defend, even if the school ultimately
prevails.
If the school has not made reasonable efforts to intervene with
problematic behavior that it was aware of, the statute requires that the
school be "punished" by having to deal immediately with a dangerous
student outside the alternative setting. This may include dealing with a
dangerous student in the regular education classroom or otherwise in the
school setting.326 This "punishment," however, sweeps too broadly, for it
323. See Bryant, supra note 65, at 520 (stating that few behavior plans other than security guards
would have immediate and guaranteed results); id. at 520 n.190 (quoting principal who reported that
school system had to resort to "hiring 'muscle' or 'protection' simply to protect our staff and other
students"); see also Rachelson, supra note 158, at 128.
324. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(2)(E) (Supp. III 1997) (emphasis added).
325. See Bryant, supra note 65, at 519.
326. See id. at 520.
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is not only the educators (who presumably had the power at least to make
efforts to minimize the risk of harm) who will be punished. The other
students-who are now exposed to a student who is dangerous and
disruptive-are also "punished," as the school and the other students
attempt to deal with this student in the classroom without loss of learning
time or injury.
The dangerous student, however, learns that school officials are
powerless to stop his or her violent behavior. By the time a school has
gathered and documented all the evidence needed and finally enters the
administrative proceedings required by IDEA, the student has many
opportunities to perpetrate further violence and disruption. 27 Litigation is
"simply too slow and too costly to deal adequately with the rapidly
changing needs of children. 3 2 Perhaps not surprisingly, disabled
students reportedly brag to other students and teachers that they cannot
be expelled. 29
Consider the case where a middle-school-aged student committed
from eleven to nineteen aggressive acts per week over a two-year period;
at least thirty of these acts required treatment by the school nurse. The
school attempted many behavior interventions to minimize the risk of
harm to others, including hiring a second full-time teacher and a full-time
aide, hiring a behavior consultant recommended by the parents,
providing special training for the staff in behavior management and crisis
intervention, and providing support staff so the student could participate
in after-school activities. None of the interventions or supports worked,
but school officials tried for two years while students and staff endured
an abusive and disruptive environment. Finally, school officials were
confident that they had met all the requirements to request a placement
change to a more restrictive classroom. When the parents objected to the
determination by the hearing officer, the school then defended its
proposal in district court and appellate court before it could finally rest
the case and place the student in a more restrictive educational
environment.3
The new amendments do little to change this pattern or to instill
confidence in educators that they can and should act swiftly and
327. See Rachelson, supra note 158, at 128.
328. Clyde K. v. Puyallup Scb. Dist. Number 3, 34 F.3d 1395, 1400 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994).
329. See Anderson, supra note 134, at 31 (referring to deposition filed in case involving student
who had brought .357 Magnum to school).
330. See Light v. Parkway C-2 Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 1223, 1231 (8th Cir. 1994).
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purposefully when faced with violent student behavior. Some behaviors
simply cannot be managed in the regular classroom. Yet other students
are nonetheless required by law to attend school and to deal with a
severely disturbed child. There is no adequate remedy for the murdered
Christine Smetzer or for any student who is injured or deprived of
educational opportunity because a disruptive or violent disabled student
is allowed to remain in a classroom setting.
3. Curing the Behavior Problem
Even if the school is able to meet the burden required to move a
violent student to an interim alternative setting, developing the
alternative setting required by the statute is a long and arduous process in
and of itself that may take up to sixty to ninety days to complete.33" ' The
process may also be expensive as schools will have the burden of
producing expert testimony to meet these standards.332 The school must
ensure that the alternative setting will enable the student to continue to
participate in the general curriculum and to receive the services set out in
the IEP. Although the purpose behind this provision-to ensure that the
disabled student's education can continue during the time in the
alternative placement-is legitimate, the burden of creating the
alternative program should not weigh so heavily on economic resources
or on teacher time that it interferes with the education of other students.
In addition, the statute requires that the IEP set forth modifications
that will address the behavioral problem so that it does not reoccur.333
Another provision requires schools to develop a behavioral intervention
plan, or modify an existing plan to address the behavior ten days after
taking any disciplinary action allowed by the statute.3 4 Teachers
certainly should (and usually do) attempt different intervention strategies
to address the serious behavior problems of disabled students.335
33 1. See Hearings on the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Hearings Before Subcomm.
on Early Childhood, Youth, and Families of the Comm. on Econ. and Educ. Opportunities, 104th
Cong. 387 (1995) (statement of William Boucher, Jr., Superintendent of Public Instruction,
Commonwealth of Virginia) (stating that according to experience in his state, developing alternative
placement often takes 60 to 90 days).
332. See Federal Disability Policy Hearings, supra note 22, at 90 (statement of Charles L.
Weatherly).
333. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (Supp. III 1997).
334. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
335. An example of interventions attempted to improve the behavior problems of one disabled
student included "explaining proper behavior to the boy; providing a 2-1 pupil-teacher ratio for field
Vol. 75:1, 2000
Discipline and Disabled Students
Sometimes a different intervention strategy will help some students
change some behavioral patterns. But the premise underlying these
statutory provisions seems to be that all severe behavioral problems
could be solved if only the school would set forth the correct program.336
"Like a team of doctors, experts are supposed to 'diagnose' a child's
malady and then recommend the proper course of treatment."337
Even if educators were able to evaluate a disabled student's precise
problems accurately-a doubtful proposition-serious behavioral prob-
lems simply may not be curable by the modification plans that can be
used in the public schools.338 Indeed, even trained psychiatrists and
psychologists are unable to determine how best to correct antisocial
behavior. Recall that the full-inclusion movement has resulted in more
and more severely disturbed disabled children being placed in regular
classrooms for all or part of the day.339 The classroom teachers-even
with help from teacher's aides, guidance counselors, and school
psychologists-simply may not be equipped to remedy the serious
problems exhibited by certain disabled students. "Realistically, there are
a limited number of ways to individualize teaching. 340
In addition, a disabled child who is included in a general education
school (or a special education classroom) is there for only a few hours a
day Monday through Friday. Even assuming that the educational plan
sets forth behavioral interventions that could help alleviate some
behavior problems if delivered consistently, the disabled student still
must go to a home every afternoon and every weekend that may not
trips; providing a teacher to work individually with him during group speech therapy; isolating him
from other pupils when necessary; and assigning him a personal assistant." Lindberg, supra note
156, at 8.
336. See Mathews, supra note 146, at A5 (quoting attorney for student who hit two staff members
and classmate as stating that behavior would not have occurred if student had received individual
attention school should have given her); see also Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. Number 3, 35 F.3d
1396, 1400-01 (9th Cir. 1994) (involving parents claiming that personal aide would solve severe
behavioral problems in regular classroom, which included name-calling and profanity in classroom,
kicking furniture, directing sexually explicit remarks to female students, and numerous assaults);
Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1208 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that parents requested aide but
aide placed with child did little to resolve behavior problems).
337. Hymowitz, supra note 10, at 27; see also Rachelson, supra note 158, at 139 (noting
possibility of misdiagnosing students as suffering from Attention Deficit Disorder).
338. See Federal Disability Policy Hearings, supra note 22, at 73 (statement of Marcia Reback);
Hymowitz, supra note 10, at 27.
339. See, e-g., Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1208 (listing toileting accidents, temper tantrums, crawling and
hiding under furniture, hitting, and spitting on other children).
340. Hymowitz, supra note 10, at 27.
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always reinforce these behavioral interventions. After all, parents and
babysitters are not bound to follow an IEP.34 Sadly, some parents will
simply not take the time or have the energy to follow through with the
behavior interventions. This may be due to unwillingness or inability-
either from lack of capacity or because time is taken up with other
children, stressful jobs, or even personal problems that may include
alcohol or drug abuse.342
At some point, people in the United States must come to terms with
the fact that our nation's public schools simply do not have the resources
to solve every societal problem. We have confused our belief that
education can itself solve many social problems with the notion that the
public school as an institution can solve these problems. But the school is
merely a means-a conduit, if you will-to give students access to
education. When the public school institution cannot solve a severe and
intractable problem, the public must accept this limitation. Instead, the
focus should be on how best to deal with the problems in the learning
environment while continuing to educate students-to propel them
forward in academic competency. 343
4. Relating the Disability to the Misconduct
The standard for determining if a student's misconduct is a
manifestation of his or her disability-whether the disability impaired
the student's ability to understand consequences and control behavior-
is problematic. First, an IEP team may lack sufficient expertise in
psychiatry to determine the relationship between disability and
understanding of consequences and the relationship between disability
and behavior control. The regulation states that the review must be
conducted by the IEP team and also by "other qualified personnel." 3"
"Other qualified personnel" may include "individuals who are
knowledgeable about how a child's disability can impact on behavior or
341. See id. (describing chaotic home life of many students who are defined as learning disabled).
342. See id. (describing how unemployed, unmarried mother of 12-year-old disabled boy with
three younger children has no time to check on her son).
343. See Dupre, supra note 9, at 842 (describing classroom as community of learning where
students perform in group that is propelled forward in academic competency). After all, other
institutions-church, family, legislatures-have not been able to solve many societal problems. This
does not mean that schools or society should give up on these problems, but that the public should
recognize the limitations of institutions and be willing to work within those limitations.
344. 34 C.F.R. § 300.523(b) (1999).
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on understanding the impact and consequences of behavior," as well as
other persons "knowledgeable about" the student's disability.3 45 This
may include the student's treating physician and other experts the parents
may provide. Underlying the addition of these persons to the review team
is the recognition that this review is a time-consuming, complex,
multifaceted inquiry.
Even if the IEP team and "other qualified personnel" could determine
that a student's misconduct was a manifestation of the disability because
he could not understand its consequences and could not control his
behavior, the statute misses some important points. It does not explain
what degree of impairment is necessary before the statute's provisions
apply. It requires the school to prove a negative-that the misconduct
was not a manifestation of the disability. Moreover one of the very
purposes of discipline is to teach students what the consequences are for
misconduct and to teach them to control their behavior in the future.
Indeed many, if not most, nondisabled children fail to understand the
consequences of their behavior or are unable to control it on occasion.
Swift and consistent discipline teaches them what the societal
consequences are.
The problem with the standard in the statute is that it does not make
any allowance for the disabled student who may not currently be able to
understand or control behavior, but could be trained to do so with swift
and consistent discipline. If school officials are hesitant to discipline this
student or feel compelled to invoke time-consuming procedures before
they feel -confident they are able to do so, the student instead learns that
he can get away with misconduct and may never learn to understand its
consequences or to control it.
The statute appears to allow a disabled student to claim that low self-
esteem caused by the disability impaired his or her understanding or
control.3 46 This would mean that the disabled student could always
invoke the protections of IDEA for any misconduct-drug dealing,
violent acts, sexual harassment-and that the disabled student would
likely be disciplined differently from a nondisabled student, especially in
345. 34 C.F.R. pts. 300 and 303, Attachment 1, Analysis of Comments and Changes, 64 Fed. Reg.
12,625 (1999).
346. In School Board v. Malone, the court disagreed with an IEP committee that found no causal
connection between the student's disability and his drug dealing. See 662 F. Supp. 978, 980 (E.D.
Va. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1985). The court decided that the student's disability caused
low self-esteem, which caused him to be susceptible to peer pressure, and that the learning disability
prevented the student from understanding the long-term consequences of his actions. See id.
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schools with zero-tolerance rules. 47 This provision may simply result in
most students with disabilities being immune from regular education
disciplinary action."'
Researchers have suggested that reviewing a student's behavior
systematically, starting with the academic and disciplinary record, is one
way to address the manifestation issue.349 One researcher contends that
steady academic progress for several years followed by little academic
growth and behavior problems suggest a connection between the
behavior and the disability, as does a pattern of behavior indicating lack
of judgment and deficient social skills over time."' Serious acts of
misbehavior that are not typical for the child and that do not follow a
change in placement suggest that no relationship exists.'
Although determining the connection between the behavior and the
disability is problematic in and of itself, the review team cannot even
reach that point unless it has first assessed the IEP. The statute requires
that the review team determine if the IEP and placement were
appropriate before it makes the manifestation determination. 2 The
determination whether-in relationship to the misbehavior-the IEP and
placement were appropriate is fraught with possible problems. First, it
seems to put the cart before the horse. If the behavior is unrelated to the
disability, the IEP and behavior intervention strategies are irrelevant.353
Second, the statute does not require that the hearing officer or court
determine if a different placement or IEP would make a difference in the
behavior, that is, whether the misconduct would be substantially less
likely to occur in another placement.
347. See Yell, supra note 70, at 66 (noting that good lawyer could probably convince court that
misbehavior is always related to disability); see also Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1481-82 (9th
Cir. 1986) (noting that misconduct of emotionally handicapped student will always be related to
disabling condition).
348. See Bryant, supra note 65, at 529 (contending that this provision will have "enormous
impact"); Mary E. Broadhurst, Comment, The Legal Limits of School Discipline for Children with
Handicaps, 69 Or. L. Rev. 117, 131-32 (1990) (stating that expelling students for behavior that
comes from low self-image created by disability contravenes original purpose of IDEA, which was
to rectify situation where students with disabilities were excluded from school because of their
behavior).
349. See Yell, supra note 70, at 67 (citing research).
350. See id.
351. See id.
352. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4) (Supp. m 1997).
353. See Bryant, supra note 65, at 528.
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Considerable school and teacher time and resources may be spent on
this procedure-time and resources that could be spent teaching
children."5 Moreover, because a determination that conduct is not a
manifestation of the disability may result in harsher discipline, it is
"highly likely [to] be challenged,"355 and the statute provides that parents
may request an expedited hearing to do so.356 The statute states that the
school has the burden of demonstrating that the behavior was not a
manifestation of the disability, but the statute does not supply the
standard of proof that must be offered.357 After going through the
administrative procedures, either the parent or the school may bring a
civil action in a state or federal court. 58 Not only will the litigation prove
costly, both economically and in terms of time and energy of the
educators involved, but a loss on this issue (or any other litigated under
the statute) opens the door to the school district's being sued for
attorneys' fees.359 Although the courts have stressed that a group of
professionals makes this difficult decision, "courts have often overturned
decisions [of these] specialized teams" in the past.3"
IDEA's new manifestation provisions go beyond even a double
standard and set up triple standards of discipline.36' One commentator
354. See Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1482-83 (9th Cir. 1986) (acknowledging how difficult
this manifestation determination is, but stating that states accepting federal funds must also accept
burden that Congress set up to go with them). The statute clearly mandates this time- and resource-
consuming manifestation determination by numerous trained persons every time a school wishes to
impose even a short-term suspension, as well as any suspension for more than 10 days, although the
regulations do not require the review for suspensions of less than 10 days that do not constitute a
pattern. See supra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
355. Allan G. Osborne, Making the Manifestation Determination When Disciplining a Special
Education Student, 119 Educ. L. Rep. 323, 324 (1997).
356. "Expedited" is not defined in the statute.
357. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(6)(B)(i) (Supp. MI 1997).
358. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (Supp. 1I 1997).
359. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (Supp. I 1997).
360. Yell, supra note 70, at 67.
361. See Kronholz, supra note 17, at A24. This triple standard occurs because of the IDEA
provision that requires schools to provide educational services for all expelled or suspended disabled
students-even those whose misconduct was not related to the disability. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412
(Supp. II 1997). Consider the case in Missouri where four students used methamphetamines at
school. The two general education students were suspended for one year. The third student was
learning disabled, but his disability was deemed not linked to his misconduct. He received a one-
year suspension but was given a home tutor. The fourth student's disability was deemed linked to his
misconduct He received a 10-day suspension and then returned to school. See Kronholz, supra note
17, at A24.
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has suggested that because of all the problems surrounding the
manifestation determination, "it may be advisable to consider that a
child's misbehavior is always related to his or her handicapping
condition.""36 Given all the difficulties in making the manifestation
determination, the ease with which it can be challenged, and the practical
problems that will occur in educating the disabled student whose conduct
is not related to the disability during a period of expulsion or suspension,
school districts will have every incentive to determine that the
misconduct is a manifestation of the disability most of the time.363
Although this may be easier for schools in the long run and it may be
welcomed by parents of some disabled students who misbehave but will
receive less harsh punishment, it may do more harm than good-both to
the disabled student whose behavior is at issue and to all disabled
persons generally. Ironically, this provision may result in a stigma
against the disabled that many advocates for the disabled fight so hard to
overcome. The upshot of this provision and its practical consequences
may simply be that the disabled will be viewed as consistently having no
understanding or control over their behavior, surely a prejudice that.
many in the disabled community have worked for years to dissipate.
5. Treating Students as if They Are Disabled
This provision was put in place to ensure that students who may have
disabilities do not get ignored, while attempting to prevent students from
manufacturing a disability to avoid punishment. A student who
misbehaves can be treated as if he is disabled for disciplinary purposes if
the school "had knowledge" of the disability.3" The statute does not
explain whether the student is to be treated as disabled while the school
and the parents litigate the issue of whether the school "had knowledge."
Some educators maintain, "When the disability is not the cause of the misbehavior, the miscreant
should not be entitled to federally imposed special treatment which has the effect of teaching the
student that he or she is 'above the law."' Cumming, supra note 293, at 1C (quoting Georgia School
Boards Association Vice-President Gary Ashley).
362. Yell, supra note 70, at 67.
363. See Dixie S. Huefner, Another View of the Suspension and Expulsion Cases, 57 Exceptional
Children 360, 364 (1991) (agreeing that schools may wish to avoid practical difficulties of
determining whether misconduct is related to disability).
364. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(B) (Supp. III 1997).
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Moreover, the broad definition of knowledge "errs on the side of
overprotection." '365 This provision would come into play if a parent were
to contend that any school employee expressed concern about the
behavior of a student to any other school employee. 66 Expressing
concern about a student's behavior is a common occurrence among
administrators, teachers, aides, and even cafeteria workers and bus
drivers. Indeed, a conversation of this nature is a likely occurrence
among educators dealing with a student that the school is attempting to
discipline. Surely, not every student whose misbehavior results in a
conversation with a co-worker is disabled. According to the statutory
language, however, if such a conversation takes place, the school is
deemed to have knowledge that the student had a disability and the
extensive disciplinary protections of IDEA are set in motion. The
regulations attempt to narrow this broad statutory language. The
regulations quote the statutory language but add a modifier---"other
personnel in accordance with [the school's] established child find or
special education referral system."'367 Despite its apparent virtue, there is
nothing in the statute to support this limitation.
Even if no conversation between school personnel takes place, the
statutory language gives students and parents yet another tool to claim
disability disciplinary protections for each and every misbehavior.
According to the statute, each time the student misbehaves, the parents or
student need only claim that the misconduct itself shows the student
needs special services. 6 Indeed, one commentator has stated that a
strong argument exists that repeated behavioral incidents that result in
expulsion are sufficient to qualify the student as disabled under the
Act 369 and some Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court agree.370 Even if a
365. Huefler, supra note 21, at 1110; see also Vicky M. Pitasky, The Year in Review: IDEA
Reauthorization Takes Spotlight, Cal. Special Educ. Alert 3 (Feb. 1998) (pointing out that critics of
provision claim that knowledge standard will be easy to prove and will not guard against sham
claims it was supposed to weed out).
366. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
367. 34 C.F.R. § 300.527(b)(4) (1999).
368. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
369. See Bryant, supra note 65, at 492. This seems analogous to the contention in criminal law
that if the accused commits a murder that is heinous enough, that is sufficient to show that he is
insane and thus should receive any protection available under an insanity defense. Jeffrey Dahmer,
in perhaps one of the most publicized forays into this arena, was unsuccessful in his claim that he
was insane. See Insanity Defense by Dahmer Fails, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1992, at 24.
370. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1682 (1999) (Kennedy J.,
dissenting) (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas).
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school ultimately prevails on such a claim, the student nonetheless
obtains a benefit, and the provision gives troubling incentives to
nondisabled students who wish to abuse the system.37" ' Anytime a student
or parent makes either of the above contentions, the district must provide
the student with the disciplinary protections provided in the statute until
it determines through evaluation and testing (which often is time-
consuming) whether the student has a disability.372 In the meantime,
students will be protected for all kinds of bad conduct.
This provision also gives educators troubling incentives. Some
educators may curtail their discussion of problem students to avoid the
first prong of the knowledge element. Or educators may feel obligated to
overevaluate students for any perceived problem. Teachers and other
school officials may be inclined not to discipline students at all to avoid
the complicated, resource-draining procedures. 73
6. The Loss of Suspension and Expulsion as Disciplinary Tools
Certainly one upshot of the new IDEA amendments may be that
suspension and expulsion will no longer be a viable disciplinary tool for
If... the behavior that constitutes actionable peer sexual harassment so deviates from the
normal teasing and jostling of adolescence that it puts schools on clear notice of potential
liability, then a student who engages in such harassment may have at least a colorable claim of
severe emotional disturbance within the meaning of IDEA.
Id.
371. Before the 1997 amendments, case law in the Ninth Circuit applied IDEA to students who
had not yet been determined to have disabilities. See Hacienda La Puente Sch. Dist. v. Honig, 976
F.2d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 1992). But a district court, obligated to follow the court of appeals, noted:
[T]he plaintiff has benefitted greatly from his invoking of the statute. The plaintiff is a senior
who was facing expulsion and thus would not have graduated with his class. Because IDEA's
hearing process will take several months to complete, even if the student is ultimately found to
be not disabled, by invoking IDEA the plaintiff will achieve the goal of graduating with his
class and avoiding expulsion.
M.P. v. Governing Bd. of Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F. Supp. 1044, 1048 (S.D. Cal.
1994).
372. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(A) (Supp. 111 1997); cf Laura F. Rothstein, Higher Education
and Disabilities: Trends and Developments, 27 Stetson L. Rev. 119, 125 (1997) (noting that area of
increasing concern in higher education is re-admission of students who did not discover learning
disability until after academic failure, but pointing out that higher education programs "are required
to accommodate only known disabilities").
373. See New Law Confuses Schools, Orlando Sentinel, July 5, 1998, at A6 (describing how
parents, teachers, and school officials spent hours preparing seven-page document on how to meet
disabled student's special needs after he was suspended for five days for sexual harassment).
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any student.74 Except for one suspension of less than ten days, schools
must provide educational services to any disabled student, regardless of
whether the misconduct was a manifestation of the disability.37 The
requirements regarding the interim alternative educational setting for a
disabled student who is sufficiently violent or who violates the drug-and-
weapon provision involve considerable time and resources. Moreover,
the perceived unfairness of providing educational services to disabled
students who are suspended or placed in an alternative setting, while
providing no such services to nondisabled students for identical conduct,
may simply make this disciplinary device untenable in many circum-
stances.
Some argue that the loss of suspension and expulsion is a good
development.37 6 In fact, suspension may not be a particularly enlightened
disciplinary tool. Students are out of school, often unsupervised, where
they have the time and opportunity to get into more trouble. Nonetheless,
because suspension is certainly viewed as undesirable by parents and
students-as evidenced by the challenges that occur when schools
attempt to suspend a student-it may still serve as a deterrent to bad
behavior.
Despite the ongoing arguments about the efficacy of suspension, it is
ironic that traditional disciplinary tools are being curtailed by federal law
at the same time the clamor for school order and "zero tolerance" is
increasing.377 Although expulsion may not always be in the best interest
of the expelled student, it may be in the best interests of the students
remaining in school.37 When a student is merely placed in a study carrel
374. See Bryant, supra note 65, at 492 (claiming that "the new law renders it politically and
practically difficult to continue the dual system of school discipline" and thus will end expulsion as
disciplinary tool for all students). At least in some school districts, school expulsion was already rare
even before the new IDEA amendments because it was seen as interfering with the student's right to
attend public schools. See Mansnerus, supra note 250, § 14, at 1.
375. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.121(d)(2)(i)(B), 300.520 (1999).
376. See Bryant, supra note 65, at 549-55. But see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975)
("Suspension is considered not only to be a necessary tool to maintain order but a valuable
educational device.').
377. Zirkel, supra note 161, at 569 (pointing out how schools are caught between "zero tolerance"
policy regarding guns and "zero reject?' policy for disabled students); Perry A. Zirkel, Supporting
Suspenders, Phi Delta Kappan, Nov. 1999, at 257 (contending that "new school law" trend exists
where courts are curtailing students' constitutional rights and supporting public school officials who
are attempting to deal with perceived threats to societal security, but pointing out that statutory
countertrend exists in terms of rights of students with disabilities).
378. See Rachelson, supra note 158, at 148.
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or timeout room or in detention, students, teachers, and staff are still in
danger before and after school and while the student is in common areas
like school corridors and restrooms.379 Even timeout rooms are being
attacked, however, as an inappropriate disciplinary tool.38
The loss of long-term suspension or expulsion for some disabled
students or even as a disciplinary tool in general might not be such a
great loss if schools had other alternatives for placement that would
avoid disrupting the education of other students. Some counties in
Georgia are trying "boot camps" so that troubled students are not merely
out on the streets, but are working and-it is hoped-learning, perhaps
even learning to control their improper behavior.38" ' Vermont has started a
program for disruptive disabled students called "Success School," a
separate school with low teacher-student ratio and numerous teachers'
aides, to educate students who, if left in a regular classroom, "can
intimidate teachers and cause so much disruption that other students
cannot learn." '382 Of course all such programs raise resource-allocation
issues.3 Moreover, for a disabled student, moving to a boot camp or the
Success School would be considered a change in placement that must be
afforded all the procedural protections of IDEA. Parental permission
would be needed or the school may need to go to court to effect this kind
of change. A placement in an alternative school (and even in-house
suspension or study carrels) that lasts over a certain period or that is used
repeatedly may also be deemed a change in placement for a disabled
student if the student has an IEP that states that he or she is to be
379. See id. at 149. Recall the case of Christine Smetzer. See supra notes 67-68 and
accompanying text; infra notes 386-90 and accompanying text.
380. See, e.g., Jordana Hart, School Closes 'Timeout' Room, Boston Globe, Oct. 31, 1998, at BI
(describing how "outraged parents" succeeded in having timeout room closed and sought ouster of
principal who used it to calm down uncontrollable students).
381. See Michael Weiss, Forget Suspension; In Newton Troublemakers Go to Boot Camp, Atlanta
L & Const., Mar. 23, 1995, at R1. The New York City Board of Education has also voted to
establish three middle schools and three high schools to educate 300 of the city's most violent
students. See Somini Sengupta, School Board Is to Create Schools for Violent Students, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 6, 1997, at B2; see also Steve Bickerstaff et al., Preserving the Opportunityfor Education:
Texas' Alternative Education Programs for Disruptive Youth, 26 J.L. & Educ. 1 (1997). But see
Editorial, Inappropriate Penaltyfor Students, Atlanta J. & Const., Oct. 15, 1995, at C6 (criticizing
boot camps).
382. Joetta L. Sack, Disruptive Spec. Ed Students Get Own School, Educ. Wk., Apr. 16, 1997, at 1.
383. For example, it costs the Vermont school district roughly $11,000 to educate a disabled
student at the Success School, compared with the $3824 it spends per student in regular classes. See
id. The establishment of the so-called Second Opportunity Schools in New York City is estimated to
cost $7.2 million. See Sengupta, supra note 381, at B2.
Vol. 75:1, 2000
Discipline and Disabled Students
educated in a regular classroom. Thus, a disabled student who disrupts a
classroom may challenge any disciplinary act that removes the student
from a regular classroom. In essence, the nondisabled students are
deemed part of the disabled student's education plan, and separation
from them, even if the disabled student is impeding their education, may
violate IDEA.
7. Reporting Misconduct
a. To School Officials
The murder of fifteen-year-old Christine Smetzer in a school restroom
in St. Louis was the impetus behind the new provision that allows a
transferring school to tell the new school about a disabled student's
discipline problems."' The convicted murderer was a special education
student who had been diagnosed with a behavior disorder and who had a
history of discipline problems." 5 This student had attended a school that
served only disabled students-the "most supervised, controlled
environment for behavior-disordered students." '386 He was subsequently
transferred to Christine's school (supposedly as part of a mainstreaming
or inclusion effort and an IEP plan that called for his transfer from one
high school to another) where he would attend fewer special education
classes. The new school was not informed of the student's problems.387
Two days after the transfer, Christine was murdered, her head flushed in
the toilet, and her beaten and half-clothed body wedged between the
toilet and the wall. 8
As a result of this tragedy, Missouri Senator John Ashcroft pushed for
this provision that now enables school officials to be informed about
students with a history of disciplinary problems. 9 Of course, what
schools are able to do once they are informed may be another matter.
384. See David L Greene, New Law for Tracking Disciplinary Records of Disabled Students, St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, June 5, 1997, at 8A.
385. See Aitchison, supra note 314, at BI; Virginia B. Hick et al., Behavior-Disordered Students
Pose Dilemma, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 29, 1995, at ID.
386. Hick et al., supra note 385, at ID.
387. See Tim O'Neil & Virginia B. Hick, Principal: "We Didn't Know Anything About This
Kid," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 24, 1995, at 13A.
388. See id.
389. See Editorial, Bright Idea for Students with Disabilities, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 8,
1997, at 2B; see also Hick et al., supra note 385, at ID.
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Subjecting students to surveillance or an escort when they pass between
classes or go to the restroom-apparently one measure that might have
helped with this particular student-may be problematic (putting aside
the economic cost of such an undertaking). If inclusion and main-
streaming are supposed to avoid stigmatizing a disabled student, parents
may object to their child's being treated differently without more proof
that the student would harm others.
Some states have passed statutes that require the state courts to notify
school systems when students have been convicted on felony charges.
For example, the Georgia General Assembly recently passed a statute
that requires the superior court to notify the school superintendent within
thirty days of a felony conviction of any student who is at least seventeen
years of age.39 ° Another recently enacted statute requires the court to
provide such notice for any student between thirteen and seventeen who
is convicted or adjudicated delinquent for murder, voluntary man-
slaughter, rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, sexual
battery, and armed robbery committed with a firearm.39' Information
received by the court "or from any other source" that a transferring
student has been convicted of a felony must be shared with "all teachers
to whom the student is assigned." '392 These provisions at least make
teachers aware of past problems with their students, nondisabled and
disabled alike, and may enable them to structure the classroom
environment to avoid future misconduct.
b. To Parents
Both IDEA and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA)393 protect disabled and nondisabled students from disclosure of
their educational records to unauthorized third parties.394 FERPA defines
390. See Ga. Code Ann. § 15-6-36(b) (1998).
391. See Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-5(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vii) (1998); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 10-
233h (West 1996) (providing for notification for felony or class A misdemeanor); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 985.207 (West 1997) (providing for immediate notification to school district for violation of law
that would be felony if committed by adult or that involves crime of violence).
392. Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-671 (1998).
393. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1994).
394. See 20 U.S.C. § 1417(c) (Supp. III 1997) ("The Secretary shall take appropriate action... to
assure the protection of the confidentiality of any personally identifiable data, information, and
records collected... pursuant to the provisions of this subchapter."); see also 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(b)(1) ("No funds shall be made available ... to any educational agency or institution which
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"educational records" to include both special education records and
disciplinary records.395 The new IDEA amendments allow no exception
for informing the parents of children who will be exposed to violent
students in classrooms and in other areas at school. Yet the states'
compulsory education laws force all children to attend school, and
federal disability law may cause a severely disturbed student to be in a
regular classroom (or physical education class or music class) seated near
other students whose parents may be completely unaware that their
children may be exposed to danger. To be sure, children may be exposed
to danger from nondisabled students as well as disabled students. It may
be easier, however, for school officials to deter repeated violent behavior
from a nondisabled student. Recall that a violent disabled student can be
removed from a classroom (for not more than forty-five days) only if the
school can convince a hearing officer (and a judge, if the parent
continues to litigate) with substantial evidence that the disabled student
is substantially likely to result in injury to others, a heavy burden to
meet. Parents might wish at least to have the option of removing their
own child from a classroom (or a school) if they determine that they do
not wish their child to be in a situation where it is even somewhat likely
that their child will be injured.
Under the laws known as "Megan's Laws," law enforcement officers
are required to notify communities about certain convicted sex
offenders.396 Of course, these laws involve only persons who have been
convicted of special offenses. The purpose of the law is to warn the
parents of children who may come in contact with a convicted sex
offender to avoid the potential for repeated violence.397 Violent students
in the classroom (both nondisabled and disabled) may not provide the
same risk of harm as a convicted sex offender.39 Yet a child is usually
not forced to come into contact with a convicted adult sex offender in the
same way a student may be compelled to be near a violent disabled
has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records... without the written consent
of [students'] parents."). Privacy may also be protected under state law or the federal Constitution.
395. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B).
396. Stephen McAllister, Megan's Laws: Wise Public Policy or Ill-Considered Public Folly?, 7
Kan. J.L. Pub. Pol'y 1 (1998) (describing laws).
397. See Robert L Martin, Pursuing Public Protection Through Mandatory Community
Notification of Convicted Sex Offenders: The Trials and Tribulations of Megan's Law, 6 B.U. Pub.
Int. LJ. 29 (1996).
398. But see supra notes 384-88 and accompanying text (describing rape and murder of Christine
Smetzer at school by fellow student).
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student. With regard to the school scenario, nonviolent students may be
compelled to attend the same school as a severely violent student,
directed to the same classroom, or even told by a teacher to sit next to
that student.
c. To Law Enforcement
The IDEA amendments may prove the impetus for a change in school
discipline regarding violent crime in school. The amendments clarify that
schools may report crimes committed by disabled students to law
enforcement without triggering all the IDEA protections. To avoid time-
and resource-consuming hearings and court battles, schools may simply
report a criminal act like assault to juvenile authorities. In essence,
schools may use the referral to the juvenile authorities as a disciplinary
tool because the more traditional disciplinary tools have become so
cumbersome under IDEA.399
The report rate for juvenile violent crimes in schools currently is
purported to be significantly less than that of juvenile street crime.4"°
This may be due to the perception that the juvenile justice system is an
ineffective deterrent or punishment that fails to rehabilitate violent
offenders or because school officials wish to deal with the problem "in-
house" for political reasons. An increase in reported violent crime may
give the impression that school administrators have lost control of the
school.41 Teachers, who traditionally have acted in loco parentis (in the
place of the parent) may have the same reluctance of a parent to report a
student to the police because of concerns about stigma or because it may
harm the child emotionally. Or teachers may not wish to deal with yet
one more layer of bureaucracy and paperwork.
Failing to report violent crime in school is problematic for many
reasons. It reinforces the bad conduct for the student perpetrator as well
as for other student observers, who see that nothing really serious
399. This would violate Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 if only disabled students
were referred to law enforcement authorities. See 34 C.F.R. pts. 300 and 303, Attachment 1,
Analysis of Comments and Changes, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,631 (1999).
400. See Barbara A. Murray & Mary A. Myers, Conduct Disorders and the Special-Education
Trap, Educ. Dig., Apr. 1998, at 48, 53 (stating that only nine percent of juvenile violent crime in
school is reported to criminal justice authorities, while 37% of similar juvenile street crime is
reported).
401. See Mansnerus, supra note 250, § 14, at 1 (quoting official of American Federation of
Teachers as stating that perception that school has discipline problems is "bad public relations for
the school").
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happened as a consequence of that behavior. Moreover, allowing the
behavior to go unchecked fails to communicate the expectations of
society either to the perpetrator or to the other students and contributes to
an unstable learning environment for all. 2 On the other hand, sending a
student to law enforcement authorities may exacerbate the problem, as
the student may now view himself or herself (and believe that others
view him or her) as unworthy, and the student may continue the bad
conduct in a self-fulfilling prophecy. In addition, if schools report a
student, and the juvenile justice system fails to punish the student
effectively, the student may be emboldened to perpetrate even more
serious crimes. Other students may also get the message that the school
is powerless to stop their bad behavior and disciplinary problems may
actually increase.
The perception that schools are at least attempting to address violent
crime seriously may be worth the difficulties, however. In the wake of
staggering increases in violent crime by juveniles, many states have
reconstituted their juvenile justice system.43 Tragically, we have learned
from places like Pearl, Mississippi; Paducah, Kentucky; Springfield,
Oregon; and Littleton, Colorado, that the schoolhouse is no longer a safe
haven for children.' The public school institution simply is not
equipped to deal with the violence that spews forth every day from the
streets into the schools. Schools cannot educate students while punishing
or rehabilitating criminals.
Teachers and school officials have a statutory duty to report some
criminal acts; all fifty states have enacted laws that require certain
professionals, including teachers and school officials, to report child
402. See Murray & Myers, supra note 400, at 53.
403. See Richard Lacayo, Teen Crime, Time, July 21, 1997, at 28 (explaining that "in the past five
years... every state except Hawaii has decided to allow some kids to be tried in adult criminal
court').
404. My reference to the spate of mass killings that has captured the concern of the nation is to
show how easily violence can ignite at school. The boy killers in Paducah and Littleton were not
identified as disabled. But see James Prichard, Teen Pleads Guilty But Mentally IIl in School
Shootings, Athens Daily News/Athens Banner-Herald, Oct. 6, 1998, at 7A (explaining that Michael
Adam Cameal, accused of opening fire on prayer circle at Paducah, Kentucky, high school, pleaded
guilty but mentally ill). Under the new provisions of IDEA entitled "Protections for Children Not
Yet Eligible for Special Education," there would be strong arguments that these violent students
could have been protected by IDEA discipline procedures. See supra notes 279-80 and
accompanying text.
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abuse to authorities.4 5 Since 1994, Georgia law has required schools to
notify local law enforcement if they have reasonable cause to believe that
a student has committed certain crimes on school campus or at a school
function, including weapons violations, sexual offenses, and drug-related
activity." 6 Teachers and school officials are immune from civil liability
for good faith reports, but willful failure to report is a misdemeanor. 4°7
School systems have discretion whether to report other conduct that may
be criminal, but that does not fall within the list of enumerated
offenses.4 °8
These provisions at least make a start toward dividing up the functions
between teachers-whose experience and expertise lie in the transfer of
knowledge to students-and law enforcement officers-whose experi-
ence and expertise lie in maintaining order. At least with regard to the
specific offenses that must be reported, the provisions help to alleviate
some of the political pressure that school officials may feel when
deciding whether to report criminal acts of students.
Now that the IDEA amendments have cleared up the controversy
surrounding criminal acts in school by disabled students, school boards
or state legislatures could enact policies that require (or at least
encourage) educators to report violent criminal acts by students (both
nondisabled and disabled) to local law enforcement authorities.4" "If an
offense is serious enough to warrant an arrest if committed on the street,
it is serious enough to warrant an arrest if committed at school.,, 410 A
fight that occurs in the school corridor may be an assault and battery on
the streets, as may be biting of teachers, throwing chairs, and hitting and
spitting at students, all of which have been reported conduct of disabled
students in school.41 Any reporting policy should ensure that reporting is
405. See Jill D. Moore, Charting a Course Between Scylla and Charybdis: Child Abuse Registries
and Procedural Due Process, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 2063, 2068-69 (1995).
406. See Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-1184 (1998); see also, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 95.2(F)(2)(a)
(West 1998) (requiring school official to notify law enforcement if weapon is confiscated from
student).
407. See Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-1184(c)-(d).
408. See Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-756(a) (1998).
409. See Murray & Myers, supra note 400, at 53.
410. Id.
411. See DeBenedictis, supra note 135, at A9 (describing incidents of biting teacher, hitting
students, kicking staff members); Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1208 (3d Cir. 1993)
(listing toileting accidents, temper tantrums, crawling and hiding under furniture, hitting, and spitting
on other children).
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evenhanded-based on the act committed-not based on racial or social
status and certainly not on disability. But the decision whether to
prosecute would be made by law enforcement officials-based on
experience and practice-not the school teacher, who has neither
expertise nor experience in criminal justice.
8. The Toll on Teachers
Classroom teachers must spend an appreciable amount of time dealing
with the meetings and paperwork that IDEA's mandates spawn." 2 For
example, the regular education teacher must be on the initial IEP team
for all disabled students who participate in the regular education
environment, as well as for reviews and revisions thereof.4"3 This will
entail a great deal of time, both to participate in the process and to
prepare for the meetings.4 4 For example, teachers must document
behavior and learning problems, any interventions or curriculum
modifications attempted, as well as the student's reaction to any change
in strategy. Schools must provide substitute teachers to allow the
classroom teacher to participate in meetings. In addition to the drain on
resources, other students are being deprived of their teacher's time and
energy. If the parents challenge the IEP and the school does not
capitulate to parental demands, teachers must spend more time preparing
to defend the IEP proposal before a hearing officer (or a court, if the
parent persists). If discipline problems occur, the teacher may need to
prepare for and participate in a manifestation hearing and a hearing to
remove the student from the classroom. If the parents disagree with the
hearing officer's determination, the teacher's time and input will be
necessary in any court proceeding if the school decides to remain
steadfast in its recommendation. In the meantime, the teacher must
document that the other provisions of the IEP are being complied with.
In addition, the teacher must institute and implement interventions to
ensure that the behavior does not reoccur and further document the
412. See Greene, supra note 187, at 5C (describing how parents, teachers, and school officials
spent hours preparing document on how child's special needs should be met and describing how
teachers nationwide face "hours of paperwork and confusion about discipline").
413. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. 111 1997).
414. See First Things First: Review of the Federal Government's Commitment to Funding Special
Education: Hearings Before the Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 105th Cong. 26 (1998)
[hereinafter First Things First Hearings] (statement of Eric J. Smith, Superintendent, Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Schools, Charlotte, N.C.).
Washington Law Review
results of these interventions. To be an effective participant in these
numerous IEP meetings, hearings, and court proceedings, the regular
education teacher will need to be trained in the intricacies of special
education law. "The time demands and training requirements will be
considerable"4 5 and burdensome.4"6
The very complexity of the process involved may prove to be a
disincentive to effective discipline for the disabled student.417 Put simply,
the time and effort it takes to discipline a disabled student may be
enough of a disincentive for some teachers simply to ignore
misbehavior.4"' This may prove harmful to the disabled student in the
long run-as he or she never learns the consequences of failing to follow
the rules of society-as well as to the nondisabled students, who must
continue to deal with the behavior problems in the classroom.419 Even if a
teacher decides to attempt to discipline a disabled student, the stay-put
provision may cause the student to remain in the classroom for months or
even years while a hearing officer, district court, and appellate court
decide whether a school's proposed change to a more restrictive
educational setting is appropriate.
Not surprisingly, teachers who must constantly deal with disruptive
and violent students with no relief become frustrated at their inability to
teach, may exhibit stress-related disorders, and start to lose motivation
and enthusiasm for teaching.420 A teacher who must obtain a hepatitis
shot after being bitten by a student (or who hears of a colleague having to
do so) will likely be affected emotionally as well as physically.421
415. Huefier, supra note 21, at 1113.
416. But see Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1481-83 (8th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging how difficult
manifestation decision is, but pointing out that states that accept federal funds must also accept
burden that Congress set up to go with them).
417. See Federal Disability Policy Hearings, supra note 22, at 70 (statement of Marcia Reback).
418. The complex procedures that schools must follow have created a disincentive to remove
dangerous students. School officials may instead decide to leave dangerous students in the classroom
rather than go through the difficult process of removing them. See Nancy L. Jones, Violence in
Schools and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 41 Fed. Bar News & J. 630, 632 (1994)
(citing spokesperson for American Federation of Teachers who testified before House Subcommittee
on Select Education and Civil Rights).
419. See Federal Disability Policy Hearings, supra note 22, at 70 (statement of Marcia Reback).
420. See Lindberg, supra note 156, at 8 (describing teacher who threatened to quit unless school
system removed disabled student who grabbed her legs, buttocks, and genitals, hit her, kicked her,
and choked her); Schnaiberg, supra note 42, at 1 (describing teacher and classroom aide who both
took medical leaves because of severe stress from dealing with disabled boy who hit and bit teacher,
threw desks and chairs, hit classmate, and kicked staffimembers).
421. See Kronholz, supra note 17, at A24.
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Teacher frustration, battered-teacher syndrome, and teacher burnout are
not problems to be taken lightly. A teacher under stress simply may not
have the energy to set forth a creative-writing lesson, or she or he may
feel that it is futile to do so as it will only be disrupted.
Not only do the teacher's time, energy, and stress issues affect the
education of the students for one year in a particular classroom, but it
may have other long-term effects. Teachers who return after stress-
disability leave-or who experience an extremely stressful year even
without such a leave-are likely to feel discouraged, and some of their
enthusiasm for future teaching will surely be dampened. Other teachers
who see this happening to friends and colleagues may also become jaded
or depressed. Teachers that take stress-disability leaves because of
unabated discipline problems will take their toll on economic resources,
as the school system must hire another teacher to take the stressed-out
teacher's place. Insurance rates may be affected. To get away from the
stress, experienced teachers will retire as soon as they are able. This too
has economic consequences, as the state or school district with a
retirement plan will pay the retired teacher as well as the teacher that
takes his or her place. Moreover, students may be deprived of the
expertise and knowledge that greater experience in the classroom often
brings to the job. As teachers increasingly are viewed as employed in
dangerous and stressful jobs over which they have little or no control, it
will be even more difficult to attract bright and talented college students
to the profession.
9. Parental Power
Even with the new dispute-resolution mechanism,4  IDEA still
promotes litigation and adversarial relations between schools and parents
that "tends to poison relationships, destroying channels for constructive
dialogue."4" Indeed there are very few disincentives for parents to
pursue a challenge.424
422. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (Supp. It 1997) (requiring educational agencies receiving
assistance to make available mediation process whenever hearing is requested).
423. Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. Number 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1400 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994); see also
Steven S. Goldberg, Discipline, Disability and Disruptive Students: Honig v. Doe, 44 Educ. L. Rep.
495, 500 (stating that developing research shows that adversarial model created by Congress is not
well received either by school officials or parents that law was intended to include).
424. See Bryant, supra note 65, at 547.
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The Supreme Court has stated that "historically it has [been] recog-
nized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best
interests of their children. 4 5 But the Court has also noted the state's
interest in children's becoming "self-reliant and self-sufficient partici-
pants in society" so they can function "effectively and intelligently in our
open political system [and] preserve freedom and independence."4 26 And
the Supreme Court has recognized that "experience and reality" may
refute the notion that parents always act in their child's best interest.427
Indeed, statistics regarding reported child abuse and child neglect by
parents show that a significant number of parents fail to meet even the
basic elements of being a responsible parent.42 8
Of course, most parents do not abuse or neglect their children. Yet
even those parents who intend to act in their disabled child's best
interests may nonetheless be influenced by forces that conflict with the
actual best interest of the child. Parents of a disabled child may have a
difficult time admitting that their child is different and needs special
help. Moreover, parents dealing with a child's disability often suffer
from emotional stress that may hinder their ability to make decisions that
prompt the best interest of their children.42 9 Parents may be frustrated at
their inability to control their child or his or her destiny. In addition,
parents may also be dealing with financial stress that may in part be
caused by the expenses involved in raising and treating a disabled child.
425. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
426. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
427. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602.
428. See, e.g., Lesa Bethea, Primary Prevention of Child Abuse, Am. Fain. Physician, Mar. 15,
1999, at 1577 (reporting that most child abuse occurs in the home); Bruce Frankel, Report: Child
Abuse Estimates Low; Federal Data Understate Problem, Gallup Group Says, USA Today, Dec. 7,
1995, at 3A (reporting that survey of parents concludes that there are far more cases of physical and
sexual abuse of children than federal reports indicate).
429. See, e.g., Theresa Glennon & Robert G. Schwartz, Foreward: Looking Back; Looking
Ahead: The Evolution of Children's Rights, 68 Temp. L. Rev. 1557, 1557 (1995) (noting how some
parents are "too stressed and too drained to provide the nurturing, structure, and security that protect
children") (quoting National Comm'n on Children, Beyond Rhetoric: A New American Agenda for
Children and Families 3-4 (1991) (footnote omitted)); Barbara M. Altman et al., The Case of
Disability in the Family: Impact on Health Care Utilization and Expenditures for Nondisabled
Members, Milbank Q., Mar. 22, 1999, available in 1999 WL 17269170 (citing studies that document
financial problems and stress, including disruption of family routines, demands on caregivers' time,
reduced social and leisure activities, and out-of-pocket expenses for disabled family member).
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Thus, even the most caring parent may be dealing with underlying
issues that cloud his or her judgment regarding the child.43 The problem
with giving the parent of a disabled child so much power over school
decisionmaking is two-fold. First, parents have no political and little
fiscal accountability, yet their wishes can have a major impact on how a
classroom functions and on school budget issues. Consider the demands
of the parent of a boy with severe behavioral problems in the following
case. The parent reportedly offered to settle the case he instituted with
the school board if his demands were met: he wanted his son in the
regular classroom; he wanted the school to hire his son's babysitter as a
classroom aide; he wanted the babysitter, rather than the teacher, to have
authority to decide whether his son would participate in a particular
classroom activity; he wanted the school to buy his son two computers,
one for home and one for school; he wanted unlimited class visitations
for himself, but wanted other parents banned from the classroom.43 The
school refused to settle, but estimated that its legal costs (not to mention
the cost in other resources) would be at least $150,000.432
Second, the parent of a disabled child is interested in the welfare of his
or her child, not that of the many other students in the community of
learning. Professor Stephen Gilles, in describing what he calls "liberal
parentalism," states that parental control over a child's education is
"presumed superior" because "the fallible human agents through whom
government must act are less likely to do what is good for other people's
children than fallible individual parents are to do what is good for their
own."4  But even if a particular request is in the best interest of one
particular child, it may not be in the best interest of other students and
their parents, who do not have a voice in the matter.434 To skew the
power relationship so that a threat from a parent can affect the learning
430. In disallowing attorneys' fees to attorney parents who represent their children in IDEA cases,
the Fourth Circuit recognized that parents involved with an IDEA claim may be "irrationally
emotional." Erickson v. Board of Educ., 162 F.3d 289,292 (4th Cir. 1998).
431. See Anderson, supra note 134, at 30.
432. See id. In my own county in Georgia, parents sued the school district because it refused to
pay the tuition for a private school placement for their autistic son in Japan. See Drew P. v. Clarke
County Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 927, 929 (1lth Cir. 1989). The parents were awarded $42,637,
representing tuition, school fees, and uniform fees for his placement in residential facilities in Tokyo
and later in Boston. See id.
433. Stephen G. Gilles, Liberal Parentalism and Children's Educational Rights, 26 Cap. U. L.
Rev. 9, 19 (1999).
434. Except to the extent that school officials can represent the interests of these parents and
students.
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environment of many other students is deeply troubling. To quote Justice
Douglas, "It is the future of the student, not the future of the parents,"
that is of primary importance.435
B. Broken Windows in the Schoolhouse
James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling published a trenchant essay
entitled Broken Windows in 1982.436 Although the essay dealt with police
and neighborhood safety, it resonates powerfully with the issues
surrounding the discipline provisions of IDEA. The essence of the essay
is that "disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of
developmental sequence." '437 The "broken windows" are a symbol of
disorder. According to social psychologists and police, "if a window in a
building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will
soon be broken."43 This is not because there are larger populations of
window breakers in some areas, but because the unrepaired broken
window is a signal that no one cares.439 Just as untended property
becomes fair game-even for people who generally would not plunder
the property of others--"untended" behavior "leads to the breakdown of
community controls.""
Professor Dan Kahan builds upon the notion of broken windows and
criminality, arguing that criminal law scholars have underestimated the
impact of social norms upon the incidence of crime." When people
believe that others are committing crime and getting away with it (or
435. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see James G.
Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82
Cal. L. Rev. 1371, 1374 (1994) (arguing that "children's rights, rather than parents' rights, [should]
be the legal basis for protecting the interests of children").
436. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, Atlantic Monthly, Mar. 1982,
at 29.
437. Id. at31.
438. Id.; see also generally Wesley G. Skogan, Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of
Decay in American Neighborhoods (1990) (supplying empirical support for "broken window"
theory). But see Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York
Style, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 291, 295, 309-31 (1998) (claiming that Skogan's data do not support claim
that reducing disorder deters more serious crime).
439. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 436, at 31.
440. Id.
441. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va. L. Rev. 349
(1997). But see Harcourt, supra note 438, at 300 (claiming Kahan's "sociology" is "not adequately
theorized").
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gaining enhanced status in the relevant community), the crime rate will
be higher."2 Moreover, public order offenses-like prostitution, petty
drug dealing, and public drunkenness-lead to "the breakdown of
community controls" because they signal that people in that community
either do not value or do not expect order.443
The broken windows idea can readily be applied to the problem of
disruptive or violent disabled children in the public schools. The problem
with the IDEA amendments is the message that is sent-both to the
community of learning in the public schools and to the larger
community. Indeed, the IDEA amendments send a clear message: to rid
yourself of the normal rules of conduct (indeed, to obtain a special, more
lenient set of rules) you need to find some ground upon which to assert
some kind of special status-in particular, some basis upon which to
claim that you are not responsible for your own conduct. This message is
a strong counterweight to the argument that aggressive disability statutes
like IDEA are necessary to alter public perceptions of disabled persons.
To the extent that the IDEA discipline amendments alter public
perceptions, the alteration is not all to the good.
The amendments also signal a lack of trust in teachers and other
school authorities to discipline disruptive or violent students fairly. The
erosion of trust in public school officials deprives them of much-needed
confidence to make important judgments about how to maintain order.
When order and discipline deteriorate, those who can afford to leave
the public school community do so. The following section illustrates how
the disorder perpetrated by IDEA could lead to degeneration of the
public school system, much as broken windows in a neighborhood can
lead to its decay.'
1. Perceptions and Models
Perceptions of fairness and consistency are important for discipline,
particularly for children. The double standards in the IDEA disciplinary
provisions cannot help but affect the perception that nondisabled students
will have of their disabled classmates. Many advocates for the disabled
442. See Harcourt, supra note 438, at 350.
443. L at 369 (quoting James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, Atlantic
Monthly, Mar. 1982, at 31).
444. See Toby, supra note 305, at 71 (noting how minor student infractions contribute to sense of
intimidation among teachers and encourage students to challenge other, more sacred, rules).
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are concerned that disabled students become stigmatized when they
attend special education classes outside the regular classroom, because
they will be perceived by other students and teachers as different.445
Advocates of full inclusion have used the stigma argument to argue that
disabled students should not be viewed differently from nondisabled
students and should be placed in a regular classroom." 6 A number of
courts have accepted this premise and have required schools to place
students with severe behavior problems in the regular classroom." 7 If
stigma is indeed an important consideration, it is likely that the double
standard for discipline exacerbates it. The double standard sends a signal
to others that the disabled student is different and cannot be treated like a
"normal" child. In addition, it is hard to see how a student who hits a
teacher, assaults other classmates, and continually disrupts class will not
be stigmatized by others as undesirable to be around. One additional
danger is that the double standard for discipline and the perceived
inability to keep disabled students from disrupting a class or from
injuring others may result in a backlash against disabled students."'
Boycotts, pickets, and letter-writing campaigns by parents of nondisabled
students complaining about the rights of disabled students have
reportedly increased." 9
Thus, the double standard for discipline has a debilitating effect on the
very student it is allegedly supposed to help. Disabled students receive a
signal that they will be excused for aberrant behavior because of their
disability.4 0 "Undisciplined, not held accountable for their acts, the
students will fail to learn community values and expectations.,' 4 ' This
445. See Dupre, supra note 49, at 817.
446. See id. at 793.
447. See, e.g., Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1207 (3d Cir. 1993).
448. See Federal Disability Policy Hearings, supra note 22, at 93 (statement of Charles L.
Weatherly) (describing backlash in community from parents); Schnaiberg, supra note 42, at 14
(stating that many observers say that if discipline issue is not dealt with it could endanger protections
afforded disabled students by "stoking a backlash against special education").
449. See Federal Disability Policy Hearings, supra note 22, at 93 (statement of Charles L.
Weatherly); see also Schnaiberg, supra note 42, at 14 (noting that parents picketed school and pulled
children out when court said injuries caused by six-year-old disabled boy were not serious enough to
warrant removal).
450. See Mary George, Armed Kids in Special Ed. Aided by Law, Expulsion Prohibited If
Disability at Fault, Denver Post, Dec. 12, 1996, at A-I (describing case in Boulder, Colorado, where
four students passed around gun at school, and only one was expelled because others were protected
by IDEA).
451. Anderson, supra note 134, at 32.
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flies in the face of the asserted purpose of the statute-to "prepare [all
children with disabilities] for employment and independent living." 452 In
addition, the double standard sets disabled students apart from the larger
community. This separation may promote "an anti-community 'badge of
honor' (misbehaving without consequences)" that schools should be
fighting to eliminate.
453
In short, the discipline double standard can have an insidious harmful
effect on both the disabled student who violates school rules and the
other students who observe how institutions like the school deal with
aberrant behavior. Both the student who misbehaves and the student who
watches the misbehavior are being taught a very important lesson. Each
student sees that there is absolution of personal responsibility for certain
children for certain behavior.
It also cannot help but affect other students as they watch their teacher
or their aide being ignored, shouted at, or-in some cases-hit or
bitten.41 They see that the important adults in their lives, their teachers,
are hesitant to act and, in some cases, powerless to stop the misconduct, a
frightening realization for some children who trust that adults can protect
them from harm.455
It is possible, however, that the discipline double standard could be
used to teach nondisabled students that they should be tolerant of
problems that disabled students have and should learn to understand why
disabled students will be treated differently. While a good argument in
theory, it would require other students to incorporate a certain world
view-one that is rich in complexity and often hard even for some adults
452. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 111 1997).
453. Anderson, supra note 134, at 32. The author is quoting officials of the Commonwealth of
Virginia who contested a Department of Education decision that Virginia must continue alternative
special education for expelled special education students, even those who had sold drugs or assaulted
other students. Virginia challenged the decision in court as regards students whose misconduct was
not related to the disability. Although the Fourth Circuit held that schools need not provide
educational services to disabled students who were expelled or suspended long-term due to
misconduct that was unrelated to the disability, see Virginia Dep't ofEduc. v. Riley, 23 F.3d 80, 86-
87 (4th Cir. 1997), the new IDEA amendments ensured that the victory was short-lived. See supra
note 239 and accompanying text.
454. See Schnaiberg, supra note 42, at 14 (reporting on mother who described child as being
afraid to go to class with violent six-year-old who bit and hit teacher and threw desks and chairs);
see also Lindberg, supra note 156, at 8 (describing how staff at one school were in "daily fear of
having their persons violated" by 12-year-old disabled student).
455. As one educator put it, "We're going to have a whole generation of kids who don't have
appropriate controls in their life." Kittredge, supra note 227, at 1 (quoting Peggy McAllister,
Executive Director of New Hampshire Association of School Principals).
Washington Law Review
to grasp. Children may be able to grasp the fundamental idea of such a
value system, given enough time and resources to educate them in this
view. What is most important, however, is that this social benefit works
only if the education of the nondisabled student is not being harmed by
violence, disruptions, or distractions. It is true that schools are perhaps
the first exposure many children have to the notion of civil liberties.4 6
But another important function of public schools is to serve as a working
model of social order.457 Indeed, schools may be the most important
model of social order that young people observe before they become
adults with the concomitant rights and responsibilities of citizenship.
Another argument for keeping the misbehaving disabled student in the
classroom, rather than in an alternative placement, is that the disabled
student will eventually model behavior after nondisabled students. Some
researchers, however, dispute that good behavior is contagious.
Researchers like Professor James Kauffman maintain that many disabled
students simply do not have the "subskills they need to benefit from
modeling." '458 They often "do not retain what they observe, do not know
when to produce the behavior and are not motivated to do so." '459 And if
modeling does indeed occur, it may not necessarily work the way it is
intended. If students do mimic what they see, the nondisabled students
may begin to model their behavior after the disabled student with the
behavior disorder.46
2. Erosion of Confidence
Perhaps the most significant effect of the new disciplinary amend-
ments is that they signal the continued erosion of confidence in school
authority. Teachers and school officials need to be able to maintain
control over the entire student population. Instead, at a time when violent
juvenile crime-including violence at school-seems to be at epidemic
456. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 385-86 (1985) (Steven, J., dissenting).
457. See Bethel Sch. Dist. Number 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
458. What to Do with the Disruptive Child, Am. Pol. Network Daily Rep. Card, Sept. 14, 1994, at 5.
459. Id.; see Dupre, supra note 49, at 826-29 (explaining research regarding modeling); see also
Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. Number 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1994). The court pointed to
the findings of doctors of a student with severe behavioral problems that the student was socially
isolated in the regular classroom, had few friends, and suffered under a great deal of stress from the
teasing inflicted on him by other students. Having seen how cruel children can be to nondisabled
children, this finding does not seem surprising to me.
460. See Lindberg, supra note 156, at 8 (reporting that classmates mimicked disabled student who
grabbed teacher's genitals and hit and choked teacher).
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proportions, schools making decisions about discipline can never be
certain about rendering out swift and sure punishment."
It is difficult to make predictions about behavior. Forecasts can be
even more difficult when dealing with a disturbed disabled student,
whose behavior may be unusually erratic and impulsive. Yet courts
reviewing discipline decisions under IDEA often second-guess school
officials seeking to remove a violent or disruptive student to an
alternative placement. Consider the case where a court denied a request
to remove a student who brought a weapon to school because school
officials did not adequately explain why they did not simply search that
student regularly for weapons before seeking to move the student to an
alternative placement.462 Or consider the case where a court refused to
grant a school injunctive relief for a sixth-grade disabled student who
assaulted classmates, punched classmates in the face causing bruising,
and shoved the school principal. The court explained that the student's
behavior up to that point neither resulted in physical damage to property
nor required the injured persons to seek medical attention.463 Teachers
and school principals receive the message that they must not act swiftly
to resolve a problem. Instead of addressing serious discipline problems
with confidence, they must walt until a child or an adult is seriously
injured before asking a court to remove a troubled student from the
classroom.!4 Moreover, the possibility of protracted litigation and
payment of parents' attorneys fees deter school boards and admin-
istrations from trying to discipline disabled students.465 "It is just a lot
461. "'Every time a kid was even literally put out in the hall, put in in-school suspension,
anything, they had to do these seven pages' of paperwork" because of the new law. Greene, supra
note 187, at 5C (quoting Beverly Columbo, teacher interviewed at National Education Association's
annual convention); see also Editorial, Violent Students, S.F. Chron., Jan. 22, 1988, at A26 (noting
that when violence occurs, teachers need to be able to make "quick, realistic decisions" to assure that
safety of all children is of "paramount consideration").
462. See Student with Razor Should Stay Put, District Court Rules, Special Educator, Mar. 28,
1997, at 1; see also Light v. Parkway C-2 Sch:Dist, 41 F.3d 1223, 1228 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that
school district must show that it had done "all that it reasonably can to reduce the risk that [a] child
will cause injury").
463. See Phoenixville Area Sch. Dist v. Marquis B., 25 IDELR 452, 453 (E.D. Pa. 1997); District
Could Not Prevent Student's Return Where Behavior Was Not Suff ciently Dangerous, Special
Educator, Mar. 28, 1997, at 14.
464. See Federal Disability Policy Hearings, supra note 22, at 70 (statement of Marcia Reback).
465. See Stanfield, supra note 9, at 2103.
Washington Law Review
easier to give in to the parents" than to spend months, perhaps years, and
considerable human and economic resources litigating the issue.'
The public, seemingly unaware of the double standards under which
school must operate, continues to demand safe and orderly schools. In
addition, courts continue to emphasize that schools have a "special
obligation to ensure that students entrusted to their care are kept out of
harm's way" '467 and stress the "traditional authority and responsibility of
the local school board to ensure a safe school environment.""4  When
schools are unable to ensure a safe or productive learning environment,
parents wish to remove their children from public schools. At some level,
IDEA's discipline constraints may be fueling a new direction in school
reform.
3. School Choice
A subtle but extremely significant issue underlies any issue relating to
school discipline. Indeed, this issue pierces the integrity, and perhaps
even the continued existence, of the public school institution. The issue
is, of course, school choice and its effect on the school as an agent of
social integration.
One of the great strengths of the public school institution is its ability
to encourage social integration. Indeed, this nation may have no other
institution with the same potential of integrating rich and poor on a daily
basis and inculcating our commitment to representative democracy while
children are young and before they become set in their views. Learning
to deal with, and perhaps even be friends with, children of a different
economic, racial, or religious background can be an enriching experience
for children.469 It helps children become more sensitive to others, and
they may gain a new perspective on the economic, political, and social
issues that they will face (and vote on) as adults.470 Indeed, one of the
strengths of the inclusion movement is that nondisabled students may
learn to better understand disability issues. I have argued elsewhere that
466. Interview with Mark Proffitt, Principal of Lawrence School in Middleton, Conn., in
Worcester, Mass. (Oct. 6, 1998).
467. Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. Number 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1994).
468. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981).
469. One of my law students, who said she was very poor as a child, once told me that going to
school with upper-middle-class children inspired her to work hard at school so that she could change
her life to be more like theirs.
470. This is a two-way street. More affluent children may also learn about poverty.
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this is indeed a commendable goal that works in many situations.471 If the
disabled student impedes the education of other students, however, the
cost is too great.4 72
In some areas in this countfy, however, the public school no longer
acts as an agent of social integration.47' Many parents, including
President Clinton and public school teachers themselves, have taken
Judge Keep's advice and placed their children in private schools, which
do not have the same constraints placed on them as public schools
regarding issues like discipline.474 Students, both black arid white, who
are committed to learning often transfer out of troubled public
institutions to private or parochial schools, or they find a friend or
relative to live with in the catchment area of a better school.475 Although
there are numerous individual reasons for these decisions, school
discipline is often cited as one of the significant problems associated
with public schools.476 Thus, in many urban areas, the public schools
have become the enclaves of poor racial minorities and the disabled (who
may demand and obtain appropriate educational services under IDEA).
These schools no longer even remotely resemble an institution of social
integration.477
471. See Dupre, supra note 9, at 821-22 (stating that disabled students who do not disrupt
learning in regular classroom should certainly be included and may teach other students about
tolerance).
472. Moreover, it is difficult to see how a disabled student with severe behavioral problems who
continually disrupts the learning process and assaults other children will engender positive feelings
about the disabled.
473. See David D. Boaz, Five Myths About School Choice, Educ. Vk., Jan. 27, 1993, at 12
(noting that in Manhattan, public schools are nearly 90% black or Hispanic and private schools are
more than 80% white).
474. See DeBenedictis, supra note 135, at A9. See supra note 164 and accompanying text where
federal judge stated that situation raised by IDEA discipline restraints was one "that can cause
parents, if they have any money whatsoever, to remove their children from public school."
475. See Toby, supra note 305, at 71.
476. See Dupre, supra note 2, at 50 n.2 (discussing polls that cite "lack of discipline" as biggest
problem faced by public schools); Peter Applebome, Milwaukee Is Forcing the Debate on Vouchers
for Church Schools, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1995, at Al (quoting parent as stating, "I don't think
there's enough discipline [in the public schools], and I want religion in the school."); Schnaiberg,
supra note 42, at 1 (describing how parents removed children from public school when court said
that injuries caused by violent six-year-old were not severe enough to warrant his removal when he
hit and bit teacher, hit classmates, and threw desks and chairs).
477. Professor Suzanna Sherry maintains that the nation's citizens need an education that prepares
them to "exercise both the rights and the responsibilities of citizenship." Suzanna Sherry,
Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 131, 132 (1995). She
Washington Law Review
Some argue that the school choice movement, if successful, would
ensure that more school districts are brought to this level.478 They argue
that vouchers or tax credits will help only the middle class.479 A voucher
or tax credit may be of little value to a poor family with little income. For
example, a seventh-grade student would need $7,521 in tuition plus over
$500 in bus fees to attend Athens Academy, a well-regarded private
school in my town of Athens, Georgia.48
It is also not clear from most school choice plans the extent to which
private schools would be required to accept racial minorities,48 ' disabled
students (particularly those with severe behavioral disorders), or-in the
case of sectarian schools-students of a different religion or no religion.
If private schools can limit the number of disturbed disabled students or
low-achieving nondisabled students, these students may be left behind in
the public schools. In addition, when private schools limit student
admission, they do not function as agents of social integration, and they
help to weaken the one public institution that does by "skimming off"
the better-behaved, higher-achieving, wealthier students.482 Of course,
private schools can currently function in this manner, but they do not
benefit from additional taxpayer funds to do so.
Because many of the private schools subsidized from tax dollars are
sectarian, First Amendment Establishment Clause issues permeate the
voucher/tax credit issue. Although one court upheld a school-choice plan
against an Establishment Clause challenge,483 some scholars believe that
maintains that voucher plans help to serve that goal by improving education quality and by reviving
individual responsibility. See id. at 200-01.
478. See Jeanne Allen, Heritage Found. Reps., Nine Phoney Assertions About School Choice
(1991) (quoting Wisconsin school official who stated that school choice hurts common schools
established for common societal good); see also Michael Olivas, Information Access Inequities in
Voucher Plans, 10 J.L. & Educ. 441 (1981).
479. See Molly Townes O'Brien, Private School Tuition Vouchers and the Realities of Racial
Politics, 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 359, 362 (1997) (claiming that private school tuition vouchers are
"fundamentally incompatible with the goal of providing an education for citizenship").
480. See Athens Academy Tuition Information 1998-99 (on file with author).
481. Recall that many private "academies" in the South were started to avoid the effect of Brown
v. Board of Education. See Michael Heise, School Choice, Education Policy and Legal Theory:
Uncomfortable Yet Inevitable Intersections, Chi. Pol'y Rev., Spring 1997, at 79, 86-87 (noting
scholars who contend school choice policies would exacerbate racial and class imbalances in
schools).
482. Bill Honig, School Vouchers: Dangerous Claptrap, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1990, at A25.
483. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 611-20 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466
(1998); Joan Biskupic, Wisconsin Wins School Vouchers Case, Wash. Post, June 11, 1998, at A-i
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school-choice plans intrude too deeply into the division between church
and state.41
4
To be sure, it is possible that the market theorists are correct-that
competition will only strengthen public schools, and they will emerge a
stronger institution that will be an even more viable force for social
integration.485 Or there may be an unspoken, insidious motivation-to
dismantle public schools as an institution by those who are opposed to
this mission.8 6
Unraveling the possible effects of and the motivations behind the
school choice movement is beyond the scope of this Article. Yet the
school-choice issue lurks behind the discipline issue. Every parent who
moves his or her child to private school (or wishes to do so) because of
perceived discipline problems in the public school will have an incentive
to join the school-choice bandwagon. If it is not the intent of those who
would restrain school discipline for the disabled to increase support for
school choice, it may nonetheless be the result.
VI. SOLVING THE DISCIPLINE DILEMMA
A. Using the Attorneyship Model of Representation
The problems with school discipline and the disabled student are
likely to continue. A clear and definitive correction lies with Congress.
Congress, however, has been unwilling to act without more of a public
outcry. "Few lawmakers want to court accusations that they have an
animus against disabled children."48 One reason Congress has such
difficulty coming to terms with discipline and the disabled is Congress'
(reporting decision in Jackson that using taxpayer-funded vouchers violates neither state nor federal
Constitution).
484. See Heise, supra note 481, at 86 (explaining likelihood that publicly funded school choice
programs that include religious schools will generate challenges under Establishment Clause, but
noting that excluding religious schools may raise Free Exercise issue). Any limitation on religious
schools would severely curtail the school choice issue, as approximately 78% of the nation's private
elementary and secondary schools are religiously affiliated. See id.
485. But see Mary Jane Guy, The American Common Schools: Institutions at Risk, 21 J.L. &
Educ. 569, 575 (1992) (arguing that instead of shifting to market-driven system of education, policy
makers should take care of "one best system" already in operation).
486. See O'Brien, supra note 479, at 362-63 (asserting that "voucher movement, in the context of
its history and assumptions, demonstrably coincides with the white conservative pursuit of
dominance and privilege").
487. Anderson, supra note 134, at 32.
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failure to use the attorneyship model of representation. Professor Marci
Hamilton makes a persuasive argument that the attorneyship model best
describes the role of the representative in a liberal republican
democracy.48 According to Professor Hamilton, "A representative under
the attorneyship model is entrusted with delegated responsibility to act in
the best interests of her present and future client-constituents while
fulfilling an obligation of continual communication."" Like a class-
action attorney, the legislator is delegated the power to make
independent judgments by weighing the desires and needs of both
present and future clients.4" The basis for the delegation is the
impossibility of running the government "by plebiscite."49' The
representative and the client-constituents are bound together in an
"overarching mutual political commitment" to each other.492 Indeed, the
representative acts as the "trustee" for the larger enterprise and, because
of that responsibility, may be forced to ignore the voices of some
individuals.493 Like an attorney, a legislator's abdication of the
responsibility of exercising independent judgment-by refusing to vote,
giving narrow interest groups the ultimate decision, or engaging in
pretextual decisionmaking-is a serious offense.4 ' Perhaps most
important, the communication element of the attorneyship model gives
the people the ability to judge how their representatives exercise their
delegated powers and to detect any abuse thereof.495
The client-constituents who are most affected by IDEA are not limited
to disabled students, but include nondisabled students, educators, and
taxpayers. Indeed, all citizens are affected to some degree by the ability
(or lack thereof) to transfer knowledge in the community of learning that
is the public school. To the extent that Congress has allowed one
488. See Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the Myth of Self-
Rule with an Attorneyship Model of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 477, 527 (1994); see also
Dupre, supra note 2, at 102 (proposing attorneyship model to refine definition of nature of school
power).
489. Hamilton, supra note 488, at 523.
490. See id. at 534.
491. Id. at 533-34.
492. Id. at 535 (footnote omitted).
493. Id. at 536.
494. See id. at 538.
495. See id. at 540-41; cf Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) (reasoning that
"openness of the public school and its supervision by the community afford significant safeguards
against" abuse).
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segment of its client-constituents to interfere with the learning process,
Congress has failed to act as a trustee for the larger academic enterprise.
Instead, Congress has given narrow interest groups the ultimate decision,
to the detriment of others in the constituent class. This is precisely the
abdication of responsibility that Professor Hamilton describes so
cogently.496
One way to force Congress to use the attorneyship model is to remind
Congress that it has more than one client-constituent to represent. The
concerns of educators alone have not been enough to effectuate
concerted change. The impetus for change apparently must come from a
more formidable group than educators who, after all, may be viewed as
acting in part from frustration at the loss of power.
Despite the restrictions placed on them by IDEA, educators must
steadfastly work hard at the difficult task of propelling students forward
in academic competency. In their continuing efforts to maintain a safe
and orderly learning environment, however, educators must enlist the
help of other institutions-the courts, the press, and the general
community-to aid in this mission.497 If there is indeed a serious problem
with the way the federal law deals with discipline and disabled students,
parents, taxpayers, and the general community should be made fully
aware of the issue. After all, educators are not the only affected persons
when the public schools deteriorate.
Congress may have given one answer to the vexing issues surrounding
disciplining the disabled in the text of the 1997 IDEA amendments.
Congress added a new purpose to IDEA: "[T]o prepare all children with
disabilities for employment and independent living." '498 The purpose of
496. See Hamilton, supra note 488, at 538.
497. See Toby, supra note 305, at 73 (noting that when school is isolated from local community,
"if a large enough proportion of students misbehaved, teachers and principals would have difficulty
maintaining order").
498. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(d)(1) (Supp. Er[ 1997). Despite this laudable purpose, it is doubtful that all
children with disabilities will ever be prepared for "employment and independent living." For
example, the child in Timothy W. v. Rochester, N.H., Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954 (lst Cir. 1989),
suffered from spastic quadriplegia, cerebral palsy, seizure disorder, and cortical blindness. See id at
956. The school district proposed to offer no education because it claimed the child could not benefit
from one. See id One physician noted that the boy responded to sounds and recommended physical
therapy and stimulation; another physician stated that the child had no educational potential. See id.
The court determined that IDEA was intended to ensure that all children with disabilities receive a
free appropriate education regardless of the severity of the disability. See id. at 960. The First Circuit
remanded the case for the development of an appropriate individual education plan and for a
determination of damages. See ia at 973. Nonetheless, self-sufficiency is an important goal for many
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school discipline is to keep an ordered environment in the community of
learning so that students can obtain an appropriate education. If students,
disabled and nondisabled alike, "are to learn their roles and
responsibilities in school and society"-if they are to be prepared for
employment and independent living--"they must understand the
purposes of rules and the consequences of not adhering to those rules." 4
It is in obtaining a "serious education'5 °O and what each student does
with his or her life based on that education that helps to make a better
society. To the extent that IDEA spells out that every child-disabled or
nondisabled-should have access to education, it is a laudable statute.
But to the extent it allows one group of students to impede the access of
other students to education, it is flawed.5"'
Courts interpreting IDEA provisions should use the stated purpose of
the Act as a guiding principle when they deal with difficult disciplinary
issues. Using this purpose as a framework, courts can and should
interpret IDEA provisions wherever possible to allow educators to
maintain a safe and orderly school environment. For example, if a
student is continually disruptive after the school has tried various
interventions, courts could agree that the IEP is not effective and allow
the school to change the student's placement." 2
School officials should certainly continue to work at resolving
placement and discipline issues in a nonadversarial manner. But if
discipline problems are indeed impeding learning and a parent refuses a
reasonable placement change proposal, the school should not capitulate
from fear of litigation. Rather, it should marshal its evidence and its
resources and stand firm. The economic loss and the immeasurable loss
to the community of learning-when multiplied over the many cases
where schools capitulate to unreasonable and unnecessary parental
demands because of the desire to avoid a lawsuit-may be much greater
disabled students. See Robert C. Hannon, Returning to the True Goal of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act: Self-Sufficiency, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 715 (1997).
499. Yell, supra note 70, at 69.
500. Dupre, supra note 2, at 97.
501. See generally Mark Kelman & Gillian Lester, Jumping the Queue: An Inquiry into the Legal
Treatment of Students with Learning Disabilities 145, 154, 156 (1997) (criticizing IDEA for
allowing resources to be skewed toward students with learning disabilities to detriment of troubled
learners who are not disabled).
502. Cf Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1207 (3d Cir. 1993) (reflising to allow change
in placement for child whose behavior included toileting accidents, temper tantrums, crawling and
hiding under furniture, touching, hitting, and spitting on other children, teacher, and teacher's aide).
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than the cost of litigation. Parents and other advocates for the disabled
must understand that the needs of the disturbed disabled student with
severe behavioral problems cannot impede the learning of other students.
Surely, the parents of nondisruptive and nonviolent disabled students
want their children to be educated in a safe and effective manner. Even
special education teachers contend that students with severe behavioral
disorders can destroy the learning environment in a special education
class, harming the education of other disabled students."0 3 Disability
advocates should come to terms with the idea that a small number of
disturbed disabled students should not hold others students-disabled
and nondisabled alike-hostage to their outbursts.
Of the many issues that affect the fabric of a community, the integrity
of its public schools must rank at or near the top. To the extent that
privacy laws allow, parents and the community should be made aware of
discipline issues and the school's attempts-both successful and
unsuccessful-to resolve them."° If it is necessary to litigate to maintain
an effective school environment, educators should not hesitate to do so
and should make sure that the press and taxpayers are aware of all issues
that are considered public record. Particularly in the case of disruption
and distraction, parents may not realize the amount of learning that is lost
each day and more subtly over time as tired and burned-out teachers lose
enthusiasm and motivation. Still others may believe that any attempt at
change would be futile, or they may simply have more pressing problems
in their lives. But many parents, including the parents of nondisruptive
disabled students, would probably be astonished to learn the extent to
which federal law restricts disciplinary action against disabled students
503. See Phyllis B. Librach, Two Boys Double Trouble in School; Their Cases Exemplify What
Educators Face, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 19, 1995, at IA. One teacher of learning-disabled
students stated that she was unprepared to teach students with severe behavioral problems who
constantly disrupted her class and impeded the learning of other disabled students in the class. See
id. She kept a log of the disruptive behavior of one eight-year-old. One entry read: "Called the
teacher names. Crawled around on all fours making noises like a dog. Refused to stay seated.
Walked around room. Refused to sit down when told. Sat in trash can and rocked back and forth
until it fell over with him in it Had girl down on floor, lying on.top of her with both of his hands on
her throat choking her." Id,
504. A detailed examination of relevant privacy laws is beyond the scope of this Article, but the
anonymity of students who cause discipline problems is a significant issue. Both IDEA and the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act protect the confidentiality of student records-including
student disciplinary records-as well as "personally identifiable" information. See supra note 394
and accompanying text.
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and the amount of economic and human resources that must be expended
to effectuate any change in placement.0 5
If courts make a decision that is harmful to school discipline-either
because judges feel compelled to do so because of clear statutory
language or because judges refuse to defer to the professional judgment
of educators-school officials should ensure that the press and public are
aware of the decision and its consequences. To this end, the press has an
important part to play in aiding the mission of the public schools." 6 The
community needs to have safe and orderly public schools, period. If
educators are unable to maintain orderly classrooms for all students, the
public should be aware of the problem and its causes.0 7 This task may be
difficult, as school officials may be "skittish" and less than forthcoming
about discipline issues."8 School officials who feel under siege because
of school choice and charter-school initiatives may be wary about
publicizing problems."°  But full community awareness of significant
issues regarding public schools may be the only way to ensure that
505. A district court judge who did not allow a school to remove a disabled student stated, "I
understand that the parents of the other children at El Capitan high school will be shocked to think
that classmates of their children could bring a gun to school and then escape suspension or expulsion
by claiming a heretofore undetected disability." M.P. v. Governing Bd. of Grossmont Union High
Sch. Dist., 858 F. Supp. 1044, 1048 (S.D. Cal. 1994). One county in Georgia set off "an emotional
storm" when it revealed that two seventh graders with a gun and ammo clip at school, who were
expelled under a county zero-tolerance policy, were also protected by federal disability law. Doug
Cumming, Cobb Expulsions Set Political Fireworks, Atlanta J. & Const, Feb. 8, 1999, at Bl. "The
fallout crackled over talk radio for hours," with most listeners advocating permanent expulsion. Id.
Using the community of learning constituents as a potent political force may not always yield
results. See Kelman & Lester, supra note 501, at 159 (stating that "squeezing the nondisabled
student" has not "increased political pressure to obtain sufficient funding rather than simply further
compromising inadequate educational systems"). When problems occur, some parents who have the
means simply will remove their child from the school. These are likely to be the parents who care
about education but who will be likely to put the problems of the public schools out of their minds
once their child is no longer affected.
506. See, e.g., Les Simpson, Your Newspaper Is a Community Resource, Athens Daily
News/Athens Banner-Herald, July 2, 1998, at 27 (explaining how newspapers can expose problems
and help make better community).
507. State open-records acts and "sunshine" statutes may aid the press in obtaining certain
information from schools that might otherwise be protected by federal or state privacy laws. See
generally Ralph D. Mawdsley, Litigation Involving FERPA, 110 Educ. L. Rep. 897, 912-14 (1996);
Perry A. Zirkel, Caught in the Collision: A Disabled Child's Right to Confidentiality and the News
Media's Right to "Sunshine," 117 Educ. L. Rep. 429 (1997).
508. See Mansnerus, supra note 250, § 14, at 1 (quoting official of American Federation of
Teachers who pointed out reluctance of school administrators to "rock the boat" and noted that
discipline problems are "bad public relations for the school").
509. Worried about losing tenure or about bringing negative attention to the school, teachers are
also guarded. See id.
Discipline and Disabled Students
Congress reverts to the attomeyship model of representation."' 0 Recall
the role the press played in altering Congress' path during the Vietnam
War."' The effectiveness of our public schools is no less important than
our nation's security. After all, it is the public, our democratic society,
that ultimately will lose if our nation's young people do not obtain an
education that enables them to participate knowledgeably in the
economic and political process as adults.
The aftermath of the murder of Christine Smetzer is one example of
how community awareness made a difference to Congress. 2 In the wake
of the press reports of her death, parents and concerned citizens met with
school officials, who explained the restraints placed on them by federal
and state law on disciplining students with behavior disorders and the
constraints on informing school administrators and teachers about past
problems." 3 The citizens were urged to write to Senator John Ashcroft
who, as explained above, was instrumental in getting the reporting
provision of the 1997 amendments enacted."t 4 Thus, after a brutal murder
and its accompanying press coverage, Congress donned its attorneyship
role and instituted a change demanded by its constituent-clients.
B. Of Wrongs and Remedies
Even if members of Congress eventually determine they must, in the
role of "attorney legislator," exercise independent judgment on the issue
of school discipline and the disabled, they still must come to terms with
the fundamental core of IDEA. The issue is one of trust.15 The premise
that drives any debate about IDEA's substance, implementation, or
enforcement is that-without strong federal intervention-all public
schools will attempt to exclude disabled students. 16 This is based on the
510. See Sack, supra note 189, at 1. Representative Michael Castle and other members of
Congress have stated that IDEA is becoming a "top complaint" for educators in their home districts.
Ma "We're starting to hear enough about it that we're becoming increasingly concerned." Id
511. Recall also the significant effect of press coverage after the beating of Rodney King.
512. See supra notes 386-90 and accompanying text for a description of the details surrounding
her death.
513. See William C. Lhotta, Law on Disorders Under Review, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 19,
1995, at 4D.
514. See supra note 389 and accompanying text.
515. See Rachelson, supra note 158, at 157 (noting Congress' distrust of educational authorities).
516. See supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text; see also Anderson, supra note 134, at 29
(stating that this premise has led to double standard that "defies common sense and leaves children,
particularly other special education students, to face dangerous peers who are above the law").
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past bad actions of some school districts against completely different
students before IDEA was enacted in 1975. Advocates for the disabled
thus define their own context as a revolution against evil-in this case
discrimination by educators. These advocates argue that only IDEA's
restrictions can sustain the dignity of disability, so they measure every
situation by IDEA and its effect on this perceived evil. In addition, this
argument sets up a blameworthy target for legislation.
The argument may have rhetorical effect on the floor of Congress,
17
but closer analysis reveals its flaws. The IDEA discipline provisions
produce a significant conflict between two important and legitimate
rights: the right to obtain a serious education in an orderly and safe
environment versus the protection of disabled students from the arbitrary
discipline and warehousing of the past. Yet if lack of trust and the
concomitant restrictions exist because of past discrimination, the remedy
for that discrimination is only necessary for those schools that would
continue to discriminate. Put another way, assuming without doubt that
lifting some disciplinary restrictions would "turn back the clock" to the
pre-1975 era when disabled students were excluded from access to
education, enshrines these provisions forever. There is no way to know
that this would happen, but the threat keeps us from ever finding out.
Congress could regain its proper role by fashioning a "remedy" for the
wrong perpetrated by this past discrimination and by ensuring that this
remedy better serves all of the class represented. The final section of this
Article is intended merely to begin this inquiry.
A possible solution may be found by viewing the IDEA restrictions as
being similar to a court-ordered racial-desegregation plan. When courts
determined that school districts intentionally segregated students by race
and failed to remedy this past discrimination, courts placed those school
districts under court-ordered desegregation plans."1 8 But in Board of
Education v. Dowell"9 and other cases, the Supreme Court has
determined that these school districts need not be bound by these court-
ordered plans indefinitely.52 The Court recognized that the personnel of
school boards change over time and that courts should take into
consideration the good faith of the school board in complying with the
517. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
518. See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 241 (1991).
519. 498 U.S. 237.
520. See id. at 247-48.
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decree. 2' Specifically, in dissolving a desegregation decree, courts must
address whether the school board "complied in good faith with the
desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of
past discrimination [have] been eliminated to the extent practicable."5'
Courts must look at student assignments, "faculty, staff, transportation,
extracurricular activities and facilities. ''s The Court refused to condemn
a school board that once had intentionally discriminated to "judicial
tutelage for the indefinite future."524
Congress, however, has allowed rhetoric about past discrimination by
some school boards to continue to bind all school boards without any
assessment whether the school board had (1) discriminated in the past or
(2) would discriminate in the future absent the IDEA disciplinary
restrictions. Congress could fashion some Dowell-like scheme to allow
schools to discipline disabled students when the school district can show
that it has complied in good faith with the mandates of IDEA and any
vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated to the extent
practicable.5" This would give school districts incentive to ensure that
such a program existed, and Congress could fund the statute as it was
originally intended to ensure that school districts had the resources to do
so.526 A mechanism to allow parents to reinstate the disciplinary
constraints upon a showing of improper practice by the school board
should also be included.
521. See id. at 249.
522. Idat 249-50.
523. Id at 250 (quoting Green v. New Kent County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,435 (1968)).
524. Id. at 249.
525. This showing could be made through requests to the Department of Education. School
districts already must show that IDEA programs exist to obtain federal funds. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a) (Supp. 1111997).
526. When Congress passed IDEA in 1975, it promised to pay 40% of the incremental costs of
special education; this goal has never been realized. See Kelman & Lester, supra note 501, at 44; see
also First Things First Hearing, supra note 414, at 65 (statement of Eric J. Smith). Mr. Smith stated
that federal funds comprised only 14% of the special education budget in his district (Charlotte-
Mecklenburg, N.C.). See id He set forth the example of one disabled kindergarten child who has
been included in the regular classroom, but who needed the following supports: a one-to-one
personal assistant; occupational therapy; physical therapy; speech and language therapy;
augmentative communication devices and services; assistive technology; special education
instruction; special transportation; and special evaluations. See id. at 66-67. According to this
school superintendent, the cost of these supports and services to maintain this student in the regular
classroom exceeded $40,000 a year. See id. at 69. The school district received $539 in federal funds
and, to make up the difference, funds initially identified to support other regular education programs
must be shifted to cover special education costs. See id. at 67.
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Congress should consider seriously the suggestion by the Pioneer
Institute in Boston that Congress dismantle the adversarial court
proceedings fostered by IDEA in favor of a "simpler appeals process
before a committee of parents, educators, and administrators for those
parents who believe the school system is failing to serve their children
properly., 527 A more refined and nuanced statutory scheme would ensure
that the remedy envisioned by the passage of IDEA in 1975 would more
closely fit any wrongs committed in the twenty-first century.
VII. CONCLUSION
The issue of school discipline, for the disabled and nondisabled alike,
goes to the very heart of the community of learning in the public
schools.12' To be sure, disabled students are not the only students with
discipline problems. But disabled students "are the only students who
have serious restrictions placed on the management of their behavior and
on the ability of the [school] to move them to another placement. "529
Disabled students certainly should have access to public education and
should be protected from arbitrary or capricious action. But the discipline
problems in public schools must be addressed immediately so that public
school educators can focus on the academic mission of the public
schools-the transfer of knowledge to our Nation's young people. For if
the public school institution is incapable of maintaining a safe and
orderly educational environment and thus unable to impart a serious
education to its students, it will continue to lose the support of parents,
students, and community. The real tragedy will be that the nation will
lose one of its best engines for social integration. A cynic would say that
is precisely what some people have in mind.
527. Hymowitz, supra note 10, at 217. Professors Kelman and Lester have suggested ways to deal
with skewed resource allocation for students who have been diagnosed with a learning disability. See
Kelman & Lester, supra note 501, at 158-59 (suggesting that districts be allowed to withdraw
services when services prove inefficacious over a substantial period of time and proposing that
districts with lower per-pupil spending levels should be allowed to temper IEP to account for district
poverty).
528. See Bartlett, supra note 71, at 366 (stating that school discipline "has important implications
that reach beyond what is best for the individual student").
529. Federal Disability Policy Hearings, supra note 22, at 73 (statement of Marcia Reback).
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